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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 A new chapter recently opened in the scholarly study of 
sovereignty disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.  
In at least two independently researched, major publications, 
scholars have applied, in an uncommonly thorough manner, 
international law governing territorial acquisition and maritime 
resource jurisdiction to the history and current circumstances of the 
Spratly region and have arrived at similar conclusions.  In an effort to 
interpret Chinas claims and actions in the South China Sea in terms 
of international law, as well as in comparison with the claims and 
actions of other countries in the region, Greg Austin has argued that 
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) possesses rights in the Spratly 
Islands equal, but not superior, to the rights of the other countries.1  
________________________________________________________________ 
 ** All plates and charts in the Exhibits are taken from MARK VALENCIA ET AL., 
SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1997), and VICTOR PRESCOTT, 
LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1999). 
 1. See generally GREG AUSTIN, CHINAS OCEAN FRONTIER (1998).  
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Though less interested in being sensitive to the PRCs legal positions 
and developmental objectives, Mark Valencia, John Van Dyke, and 
Noel Ludwig (Valencia) came to a similar finding: The claims of all of 
the South China Sea countries have significant weaknesses if 
examined according to the principles of international law.2  Other 
scholars are also beginning to join the consensus that none of the 
individual claimants competing for control of all or part of the 
Spratlysthe PRC/Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Bruneiwould prevail over the others under international law.3 
 The development of such a consensus is valuable for a variety of 
reasons.  First, the consensus demonstrates that the international 
law governing territorial acquisition and maritime resource 
jurisdiction is clear enough to produce agreement about its 
application, even in circumstances as complicated as those 
surrounding the Spratlys.4  Second, it has revealed a host of 
exaggerated claims, obfuscations, and deliberate misreadings of 
international law advanced by the governments and media of the 
claimant countries for exactly what they arejust so much posturing.  
The debunked claims range from absolute claims to sovereignty, such 
as Chinas claim to the whole of the South China Sea on the basis of 
historical title, to illegitimate systems of baselines such as those 
published by Vietnam, China, and the Philippines.5  Scholarly 
criticism alone, of course, will not force governments to withdraw 
their unfounded claims.  But wide agreement about this criticism 
should impart a sense of futility to those insisting on these claims.  At 
the very least, it should help reduce the amount of self-deception on 
the part of scholars and policymakers from the claimant countries 
concerning the superiority of their arguments.  
 In a more positive vein, a scholarly consensus that, under 
international law, no single country would prevail on the issue of 
________________________________________________________________ 
 2. MARK VALENCIA ET AL., SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
(1997).  
 3. See, e.g., David Denoon & Steven Brams, Fair Division: A New Approach to 
the Spratly Islands Controversy, in 2 INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 303, 329 (1997); 
Daniel J. Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's On First?, in 1 MARITIME 
BRIEFING (Intl Boundaries Res. Unit, Univ. of Durham, 1996).   
 4. In the rest of the paper, the Author will use the expression the Spratlys to 
denote both the islands in the Spratly group and the water and seabed surrounding 
them (thus as a shorthand for the Spratly region).  The distinction between Spratly 
islands and features, on the one hand, and the maritime space surrounding them, on 
the other, will be made when necessary.  
 5. Notably, although Austin aims to develop a position sympathetic to Chinas 
claims, he also forcefully rejects a global objection to international law that is 
sometimes advanced in connection with the Spratly disputes, namely that an 
alternative conception of international law based on the Chinese tradition exists, 
thereby undermining the applicability of contemporary international law, originated in 
the West, to the South China Sea. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 38-40.  
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sovereignty in the Spratlys could strengthen the resolve of the 
respective governments to shelve their sovereignty claims and pursue 
their interests in the region through other means.  It should also 
encourage scholars to go beyond conventional international law 
governing territorial acquisition and maritime resource jurisdiction to 
design new ways of ensuring international cooperation in the region.  
This is not to say that conventional international law, including the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, has lost its relevance.  Quite 
to the contrary, accurate interpretation and application of existing 
international law may be crucial to achieving equity in schemes of 
international cooperation. 
 Whether aimed at refining our understanding of the legal claims 
surrounding the Spratlys, or at advancing positive solutions to the 
regions disputes, scholarship on the South China Sea is now also 
enhanced by the greater availability of information about the 
geographical and other natural characteristics of the region.  In a 
series of publications,6 the Australian geographer Victor Prescott has 
updated his 1981 survey7 of both the geography and the baseline and 
boundary claims in the South China Sea, synthesizing and clarifying 
information that would otherwise have been difficult to compile and 
understand from other sources.8  In his book Sharing the Resources of 
the South China Sea,9 Valencia offers nearly 20 colored maps that 
constitute an invaluable aid to newcomers to the subject.  
Descriptions and photographs of more and more of the Spratly 
Islands and features have also become available online.10  More than 
ever before, the sense of mystery that has long shrouded the Spratlys 
seems to be receding. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 6. David Hancox & Victor Prescott, A Geographical Description of the Spratly 
Islands and an Account of Hydrographic Surveys Amongst Those Islands, in 1 
MARITIME BRIEFING (Intl Boundaries Res. Unit, Univ. of Durham, 1995); VICTOR 
PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1999); Victor 
Prescott & Clive Schofield, Undelimited Maritime Boundaries of the Asian Rim in the 
Pacific Ocean, in 3 MARITIME BRIEFING (Intl Boundaries Res. Unit, Univ. of Durham, 
2001). 
 7. EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY INSTITUTE, RESEARCH REPORT NO.2, 
J.R.V. PRESCOTT, MARITIME JURISDICTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A COMMENTARY AND 
MAP (1981). 
 8. See PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 
supra note 6, at 47-49. See also 1-3 JONATHAN I. CHARNEY & LEWIS M. ALEXANDER, 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (1996-1998) (containing existing maritime 
boundary agreements among littoral countries of the South China Sea).  
 9. See generally VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2.  
 10. See, e.g., Qwest, Spratlys Dispute, at http://www.users.qwest.net (links 
regarding the Spratlys Dispute, including maps, photos, and statistics); Spratly Islands 
Scrapbook, at http://members.tripod.com/paracels74/photo.htm (featuring maps and 
photos); Map and Travel Guide, Spratly Islands, at http://wildmalaysia.net/ 
dest_layang_2.html. 
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 This Article takes advantage of these recent advances in legal 
scholarship and improvements in information available to the 
international public through commentary and development of a 
particular proposal for a regional, multilateral, cooperative regime in 
the Spratlys.  The proposal was originally advanced by Valencia.11  
The ways in which his proposal requires further development and 
elaboration will be described below.  It should be noted first, however, 
that the abstract idea of a multilateral joint management regime for 
the Spratlys soon might cease to be a novelty, if it has not already.12  
It is the details of such a regime that require exploration and 
advocacy.  This Article aims to begin this process by demonstrating 
how a joint management scheme can be made equitable for all parties 
involved through delineation of the area it covers and through the 
design of certain aspects of its administrative structure. 
 A main thesis of this Article is that, despite the fact that 
scholars, governments, and the interested public are now better 
positioned to assess the claims and disputes surrounding the 
Spratlys, attempts to find a solution to these disputes are hampered 
in a fundamental way: they are mired in a discourse dominated by 
concerns about the regional balance of power.  Much time is devoted 
to deciphering and speculating about the claimant countries larger 
security-related strategies, which tend to be only tenuously related to 
specific legal claims in the South China Sea.13  Instead of achieving 
lucidity through a hard-nosed recognition of the necessity of 
realpolitik, however, this discourse is often vague, highly unreflective, 
and normatively confused.  It speculates on how the parties might 
chance upon a solution to a local problem, as the larger games of 
international security and power play out in the region, instead of 
looking at how a concrete solution to the Spratly disputes could itself 
bring all claimants together. 
 The Article argues that it is time for the discussion of the Spratly 
disputes to focus on potential solutions that strike all parties as fair.  
In a fair solution, the most powerful party would not necessarily get 
the greatest share, but rather a fair share.  And it gets that share not 
because of its power, but because, in all fairness, thats what it 
deserves.  Simple as this idea may seem, it has been unduly 
neglected. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 11. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, ch. IX.    
 12. All of the claimant countries seem to have proposed joint development, the 
creation of marine reserves, or stewardship by a particular country as alternatives to 
pressing sovereignty claims.  However, most of these proposals seem to have been 
advanced during diplomatic maneuvers and usually contain elements that a rival 
country would easily find objectionable.  See generally VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, 
chs. III-V.  
 13. See generally infra Part II. 
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 Part of the reason for this neglect, of course, may be that a 
discussion of the Spratly disputes based on fairness is not easy to 
envision.  International law regarding territorial acquisition does not 
make any explicit reference to norms of fairness.14  On the other 
hand, international law regarding maritime jurisdiction makes 
prominent reference to the notion of equity, most notably in the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in connection with the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries between states with opposite or 
adjacent coasts.15  The precise meaning of equity is not stated, 
however; instead, one needs to consider how international courts and 
arbitration tribunals have applied the term to particular disputes to 
understand what equity in maritime delimitations amounts to.  Over 
time, international tribunals have deployed a range of tools
including considerations of coastal proportionality16 and the use of 
straight baselines to ascertain the general direction of the coast17to 
fashion equitable delimitations.  But more often than not, such 
tribunals do not fully elaborate or defend their verdicts before 
pronouncing them fair or equitable.18  This fact diminishes the 
relevance of the UNCLOS appeal to equity for the resolution of the 
Spratly disputes:  most commentators agree that the claimants to the 
Spratlys are unlikely to resort to either courts or arbitral tribunals to 
resolve their disputes because the complexity of the disputes makes 
judicial or arbitral decisions concerning them highly unpredictable.19  
Without articulated principles of fairness and without the hope of 
resorting to an impartial tribunal, how can any party know what a 
fair solution to the Spratly disputes would mean? 
 The approach of this Article is to work out an answer to this 
question by developing arguments for a particular version of the idea 
of a Spratly joint management authority.  The idea comes from 
Valencia,20 but he advances it only as one possible solution to the 
regional dispute among many others.21  He considers not only other 
________________________________________________________________ 
 14. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS 8-9 (2002). 
 15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, art. 74, 83, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 422. 
 16. E.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 
I.C.J. 3. (Feb. 20); Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 3 
(June 30, 1977), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 398 (1979). 
 17. E.g., W. Michael Reisman, International Decision: Eritrea-Yemen 
Arbitration (Award, Phase II: Maritime Delimitation), 94 AM. J. INTL L. 668, 732 
(2000).  
 18. For a recent verdict that illustrates this point, see Professor Michael 
Reismans analysis of the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration.  Id. at 726, 733, 734.  
 19. Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 316; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 
59-60.  
 20. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 210-17. 
 21. Id. at 210, 217-28. 
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versions of a multilateral management regime, but also gives 
significant attention to non-traditional ways of dividing up 
jurisdiction over the Spratlys.22  What Valencia does not discuss, 
however, is the attractiveness of these proposals relative to one 
another.  There is no discussion, for example, of the ways in which 
establishing a joint management authority might be superior to 
allocating control.  Nor is there an attempt to compare and rank the 
different ways for setting up the joint management authority.  Most 
importantly, Valencia leaves it unclear how an assessment of the 
relative merits of these proposals would even proceed.  Would the 
assessment be based on which proposal is most likely to be embraced 
by the parties in the near term?  If so, what would be the bases of 
such predictions?  Or would the assessment be based on normative 
considerations such as fairness and efficiency?  And in that case, how 
would those norms be fleshed out?  By remaining largely silent on 
these questions, Valencia leaves the rationale behind most of his 
proposals opaque.  It is in this sense that these proposals, including 
the version of the joint management authority idea advocated in this 
Article, are in need of further elaboration. 
 This Article sets forth arguments for a particular proposal of 
multilateral management that are framed in terms of fairness and 
that make few assumptions about security strategies of the claimant 
countries.  In the process of doing so, the Article also offers an answer 
to the question: what does a fair solution to the Spratly disputes 
mean?  The answer comes in two stages.  First, it is difficult to find 
principles of fairness to guide the allocation of control (such as 
dividing up jurisdiction) over the Spratlys.  This is because, on the 
one hand, those principles of fairness that are strong enough to 
generate determinate allocations presume conditions of the 
principles application that do not obtain in the Spratly context.  On 
the other hand, principles of fairness that are more clearly applicable 
are too weak to generate determinate results.  Therefore, a fair 
solution to the Spratly disputes cannot be understood in terms of a 
fair, final allocation of the regions goods. 
 Second, this Article suggests that a particular principle of 
fairnessformulated in Part III.B.that is too weak to generate a 
fair allocation may nonetheless be strong enough, when combined 
with other considerations, to clarify what it means for parties to 
participate fairly in the multilateral management of Spratly 
resources.  The basic idea is that although the distributive outcome of 
a multilateral regime may be unforeseeable for the claimants, the 
possibility for each party to have a fair share in its management 
might be sufficient for it to be regarded as a fair solution. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 22. Id. 
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 The Article is divided into three sections.  Part II explains why 
the discourse about regional balance of power in the South China Sea 
has become an increasingly uncertain foundation for exploring 
solutions to the Spratly disputes.  It also argues that discussing a fair 
solution to regional disputes by no means neglects the fact that states 
tend to pursue self-interest in the international arena.  
 Part III has three different purposes.  First, it illustrates, 
through the example of an allocation proposal advanced by political 
scientists David Denoon and Stephen Brams,23 that the effort to 
articulate principles of fairness in the resolution of international 
disputes can be reasonably rigorous theoretically.  Second, it shows 
that it is possible to articulate principles of fairness by reference to 
international law, even when such principles are not explicitly 
codified in international law.  Third, it concludes that, despite the 
positive implications of the first two points, no proposed principles of 
fairness can generate a fair allocation of control over the Spratlys as 
of yet.  Instead, a conception of fairness in terms not of final 
allocation, but of participation in the ongoing process of allocation, is 
more promising for the Spratly context.   
 Part IV then shows how such a conception of fairness might be 
realized through a multilateral management authority in the 
Spratlys, which would cover a large area bound by what has come to 
be called the Prescott line. 
 In the Appendix, the effect of different ways of drawing straight 
baselines in the South China Sea on the delimitation of the joint 
management area is considered.  Although controversial straight 
baselines have been published by Vietnam, China, and the 
Philippines, their effect on the shape of a multilateral solution to the 
Spratly disputes is relatively small.  
II.  THE UNCERTAIN FOUNDATION OF THE CURRENT DISCOURSE ON THE 
SPRATLY DISPUTES 
 Since the 1990s, attention to the Spratly disputes has been 
dominated by a concern to devise diplomatic measures that would 
prevent a possible escalation of conflict in the region.24  The discourse 
articulating that concern tends to trace the threat of conflict to 
changes in regional power configurations that favor China.25  With 
the end of the Cold War, both Russian and U.S. interests and 
presence in Southeast Asia began to decline, while Chinas rapid 
________________________________________________________________ 
 23. See generally Denoon & Brams, supra note 3. 
 24. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.  
 25. Id. at 5. 
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economic development has made it into perhaps the new world power 
to watch.26  Security issues in the region have thus acquired a 
completely different character from two decades ago.  Slightly 
preceding these developments, in 1987 the PRC began to establish a 
physical presence in the Spratlys where Taiwan, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Malaysia had already occupied islands and 
features.27  Although China had long made sovereignty claims to the 
Spratlys, and although Taiwan had occupied Itu Aba, the largest 
island in the Spratlys, since 1956, the PRCs new activities in the 
Spratlys sparked alarms about an era of Chinese expansionism.28 
 Chinas move into the Spratlys in turn led to a series of military 
and civilian skirmishes with the other claimant countries.29  In 
March of 1988, an armed clash erupted between China and Vietnam 
near a small reef in Union Banks, during which China sank three 
Vietnamese vessels and troops of the two sides fired on each other.30  
In 1992, China announced an oil exploration concession to the U.S. 
company Crestone Energy Corporation in the Vanguard Bank area, 
which lies within Vietnams claimed continental shelf.  China pledged 
to protect the companys operations with force31 and subsequently 
deployed submarines to patrol the area.32  An unarmed confrontation 
broke out between China and Vietnam in this area in 1994.33  On the 
western front of the South China Sea, a pattern of confrontations 
between China and the Philippines began to establish itself in 1994.34  
Philippine armed forces would detain PRC fishing vessels near 
islands that the Philippines claim and charge them with illegal entry, 
illegal possession of explosives, and illegal fishing activities.35  The 
Chinese authorities would then counter Philippine claims of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction with their own.36  One incident was also 
reported where China detained Philippine fishermen.37  In 1995, the 
Philippines discovered that Chinese personnel had built structures on 
Mischief Reef (135 nautical miles [nm] off the coast of Palawan) and 
________________________________________________________________ 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 5, 7-9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
 30. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 84; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 21-22.  
 31. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 90.  
 32. Scott Snyder, Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace: The 
South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventive Diplomacy 5 (Aug. 1996), at 
http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/snyder/South_China_Sea1.html. 
 33. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 87; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 130-31.  
 34. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 79-80. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 79. 
 37. Id. 
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deployed naval and air forces in protest.38  Chinese-Philippine 
skirmishes have been a yearly occurrence ever since.39 
 It must be emphasized, however, that non-violent confrontations 
in contested international waters are to be expected, and Spratly 
claimants other than China have also had clashes among 
themselves.40  China has not been more disposed than others to use 
military force or violent means in these confrontations.41  More 
generally, all of Chinas actions in the South China Sea that have 
been interpreted as evidencing an expansionist intentstrengthening 
its naval and air capability, occupying islands and features that 
others have claimed, enhancing and expanding its physical presence 
in the Spratlys so as to legitimize occupation, enacting domestic 
legislation that make sovereignty claims to the region, attracting 
Western oil companies to explore disputed areas, and refusing to 
particularize or justify its territorial or maritime claims42have had 
plenty of counterparts in the actions of the other claimants.  For 
example, the newest occupations in the Spratlys have been by the 
Philippines43 and Malaysia.44  Moreover, the latest sovereignty 
claims have been made by the Philippines, and these claims have 
drawn objections from other countries.45  Greg Austin disputes 
________________________________________________________________ 
 38. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 88-92; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 79-82.  
 39. Though some of these incidents involved Chinese fishermen being detained 
by Philippine armed forces near the Palawan, the majority of recent conflicts have 
taken place near Scarborough Reef, which is not part of the Spratly group of islands 
and which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.  The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry reported the following incidents near Scarborough Reef: expulsion of Chinese 
fishermen by the Philippine navy in January and February of 2000; a Chinese 
fisherman being killed by Philippine naval police in May of 2000; a Chinese fishing 
ship sunk by the Philippine navy on May 23, 2000, with three crew members from the 
sunk ship detained; expulsions of a Chinese fishing boat in February of 2001; 
Philippine forces boarding a Chinese fishing boat and confiscating tools and catch in 
March of 2001; and the arrest of 95 Chinese fishermen in January and February of 
2002.  Reports available in Chinese at the Chinese Foreign Ministrys website.  See 
Chinese Foreign Ministry, Reports, at  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn.  
 40. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 8-9. 
 41. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 301.  
 42. These are some of Chinas actions named to support a portrait of China as 
an unpredictable and noncooperative party in the South China Sea.  See VALENCIA ET 
AL., supra note 2, ch. IV. 
 43. Id. at 82.  
 44. Chinese Foreign Ministry Report, Mar. 17, 2001, at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn.  The only claimant country that occupies fewer islands in the 
Spratly group than China is Brunei.  The Chinese Foreign Ministry also protested 
Vietnams plans to establish local government in the Spratlys in February 2001.  Id.  
 45. PRESCOTT, supra note 7, at 31-34 (reporting that two draft bills in the 
Philippine senate from 1987 and 1990 developing Philippine territorial claims to the 
Spratlys).  Because the Philippines is an archipelagic state, on the basis of a claim to 
the Spratly Islands, it can also draw straight baselines around these islands and claim 
the enclosed waters as archipelagic waters, pursuant to Article 47 of UNCLOS.  
Chinese sources also report that the Philippines have recently supported its 
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interpretations of Chinas actions in the South China Sea as 
expansionist by pointing to a range of similar actions by other 
nations.46  Nonetheless, it has become common to depict China as 
posing a threat to security in the South China Sea, as [stalling] for 
time to build up its economic and military might . . . [and aiming] to 
create a new status quo in which it dominates the region.47  
Assertions of this kind have often found their way into scholarly 
publications and the news media.48 
 The problem with speculation about Chinas expansionist 
intent and its consequences is not just that they may be unfair to 
China (it need not be denied that Chinas military policy in the South 
China Sea is a source of tremendous uncertainty).  One should also 
ask whether such discussions are at all conducive to finding a 
solution to the Spratly disputes.  For a number of reasons, those 
genuinely interested in such solutions may want to take a step back 
from a discourse obsessed with power politics. 
 The first of these reasons is the vagueness that plagues attempts 
to predict the future balance of power in the South China Sea.  Just 
as often as alarms are sounded about Chinese expansionism, 
commentators have spoken of a window of opportunity for a 
comprehensive resolution of the Spratly disputes.49  A Special Report 
on the South China Sea by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1996 stated, 
It may still be possible to find a political, win-win settlement. . . .  No 
country in the region currently possesses the military capabilities 
needed to assert and maintain its claims, relations in the region are 
generally cooperative, and no claimant has yet discovered commercially 
viable quantities of oil or natural gas.50  
The report went on to qualify this statement, saying that all these 
factors are subject to change and that new developments may set 
the stage for a more far-reaching conflict than the current one.51  
Though eminently sensible, vague assessments such as this provide 
little power either to predict or to interpret actual developments in 
the South China Sea. 
 Recent events offer a poignant example of the failure of 
commentators focused on power politics to anticipate and track actual 
                                                                                                                      
sovereignty claim to Scarborough Reef and right to police the area on the grounds that 
the Reef lies within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone.  Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Report, supra note 44. 
 46. AUSTIN, supra note 1, at 301.  
 47. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 129.  
 48. See, e.g., Omar Saleem, Spratly Islands Dispute: China Defines the New 
Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 527 (2000); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, ch. IV. 
 49. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 131. 
 50. Snyder, supra note 32, at 1.  
 51. Id.  
810  VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 36:799 
 
developments in the South China Sea.  After Vietnam became a 
member of the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and began to revive its relationship with the United States in 1995, 
some commentators thought it likely that Vietnams dominant 
strategy vis-à-vis China would be to pursue such new alliances to 
combat Chinese hegemony.52  This idea seemed so plausible that 
Valencia all but assumed Vietnams voice in writing the following: 
Vietnam believes China wants to . . . establish a legal regime [in the 
South China Sea] that is tantamount to Chinas territorial waters. . . . 
Indeed, Vietnam believes that in the long-term, China desires 
hegemony over the South China Sea and that it will do or say whatever 
it needs to achieve this goalstep by inexorable step. . . .  Now that 
Vietnam has joined ASEAN . . . [it] may turn the tables on China.53  
 Although the authors noted that Vietnam and China began 
intensive efforts to improve relations following President Jiang 
Zemins November 1994 visit to Vietnam, they did not see this 
seemingly stunning reversal of positions and atmospherics as 
requiring reassessment of what was in Chinas or Vietnams best 
interest, apparently doubting that the Sino-Vietnamese efforts could 
be in good faith.54 
 As it turned out, China and Vietnam reached a historic Land 
Border Agreement in 1999.55  On December 25, 2000 the two 
countries signed the Agreement on the Demarcation of the 
Territorial Seas of the Beibu Bay [i.e., Gulf of Tonkin], the Exclusive 
Economic Zones and the Continental Shelf, as well as the 
Agreement on Fishery Cooperation in the Beibu Bay.56   Although 
________________________________________________________________ 
 52. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 90-95. 
 53 Id. at 91-92. 
54. They opined that a high degree of tension between the two ancient 
enemies lies just below the surface.  Id. at 95.  
 55. ASEAN Annual Security Outlook 2000: China, at http://www.aseansec.org 
(reporting that all the issues relating to the land border have been resolved).  The 
same source claims that proceeding from the overall interest of safeguarding regional 
peace and stability, China has maintained a highly restrained, responsible and 
constructive attitude on the issue of the South China Sea, adhering to friendly 
consultations in resolving disputes with the countries concerned. Id.  
 56. The Chinese Foreign Ministry offers the following background information:  
The negotiation on the demarcation of the Beibu Bay started in 1974 and it 
took over 20 years.  In 1993 the two states signed The Accord on the Basic 
Principles for the Resolution of the Question of Boundary Territory . . . and 
unanimously agreed to divide the Beibu Bay through negotiations according to 
the principle of fairness and in consideration of all the relevant circumstances 
of the Beibu Bay.  Towards the end of 1999, after the signing of The Chinese-
Vietnamese Treaty on Land Boundary, the pace of negotiation on the Beibu 
Bay obviously quickened and the negotiation unfolded in an all round way.  In 
the year of 2000, pushed by the leaders of the two states and under the direct 
guidance of the governmental delegations on boundary negotiation, the 
Chinese-Vietnamese Joint Working Group on the Demarcation of the Beibu 
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neither the maritime delimitation agreement nor the fishery 
agreement has yet been ratified or made publicly available,57 Chinese 
reports indicate that the remaining negotiations center on completing 
the fishery agreement and that it is intended that the two 
agreements be ratified together.58  Once ratified, the Gulf of Tonkin 
maritime delimitation agreement will be the first bilateral agreement 
either Vietnam or China have entered into concerning the 
demarcation of territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and the 
continental shelf.59  Moreover, the Philippines will become the single 
remaining South China Sea country that has entered into no bilateral 
delimitation agreements with other countries.  Of course, both the 
content and the politics behind the Sino-Vietnamese agreements will 
have to be closely examined before it can be known whether they are 
successful solutions to past disputes.60  But a discourse that does no 
more than cast a skeptical light on such apparently positive 
developments certainly seems unfit for efforts to explore solutions to 
the Spratly disputes. 
 Progress in Sino-Vietnamese negotiations is only the most 
dramatic example of the kind of events that are neglected by South 
                                                                                                                      
Bay held the 12th to 18th rounds of negotiation.  The fishery experts group 
held 6 rounds of negotiation.  The mapping experts group held 7 rounds of 
negotiation.  In between, Wang Yi, Head of the Chinese Governmental 
Delegation on Boundary Negotiation and Assistant Minister of the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry and Le Cong Phung, Assistant Minister of the Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry held three informal impromptu meetings and gave the 
negotiation direct guidance.  The two countries finally ascertained the sea area 
boundary line and at the same time made an appropriate arrangement for the 
fishery and realized the common understanding reached by the leaders of the 
two countries of resolving the question of demarcation of the Beibu Bay within 
the year of 2000. 
Chinese Foreign Ministry Report, Chinas Maritime Demarcation and Bilateral Fishery 
Affairs, July 9, 2001, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/14698.html. 
 57. Interview with Allen Langland, U.S. Dept of State, East Asia Bureau, 
Vietnam Desk (Mar. 23, 2002); Interview with Ted McDormand, Prof. of Law, Univ. of 
Victoria, Can. (Mar. 25, 2002); Interview with Jonathan I. Charney, Lee S. & Charles 
A. Speir Chair in Law, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Mar. 24, 
2002).   
 58. See Chinese Foreign Ministry Report, Premier Zhu Rongji Met with 
Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, June 11, 2001, available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/20363.  
 59. Vietnam has entered into one bilateral maritime agreement before with 
Malaysia, but it was not a delimitation agreement, but rather an agreement to share a 
small area both countries claimed as historical waters.  PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL 
CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 6, at 25-26; 3 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
BOUNDARIES, supra note 8, at 2335-45.    
 60. See Ramses Amer, The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Boundary 
Disputes, in 3 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BRIEFING (Intl Boundaries Res. Unit, Univ. of 
Durham, 2001) (analyzing the history of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations leading up to 
the border, maritime space, and fishery agreements).  
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China Sea commentary dominated by considerations of power politics.  
Less dramatic examples include the fact that, although maritime 
disputes between China and the Philippines have occurred with high 
frequency and show no sign of abating, there has been no indication 
that these disputes would escalate either.  Repeatedly, the two 
governments have been able to curtail the effects of these run-ins.61 
 A second reason to be wary of the prevalent South China Sea 
discourse focused on regional conflict is that it necessarily introduces 
a strong element of subjectivity, and, along with that, disagreement.  
The claimant countries have significantly different assessments of 
regional security issues both among themselves and from observer 
countries such as the United States and Japan.  Therefore, to put 
oneself in the shoes of any of the claimant countries requires a 
reflective attitude that current discussions do not always 
demonstrate.   
 Two examples illustrate this last point.  The first concerns the 
different attitudes claimant countries have displayed towards 
engaging in multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, negotiations to 
settle disputes.  It was mentioned earlier that most of what China 
has done in and with respect to the Spratlys amounts to no more than 
what other claimant countries have also felt unconstrained to do.62  It 
is therefore fair to ask why China should be regarded as the uniquely 
aggressive party.  Some commentators have pointed to one potentially 
distinctive feature of the Chinese stance: although China has shown 
interest in shelving sovereignty claims and negotiating joint 
________________________________________________________________ 
 61. In 1998, for example, China and the Philippines defused a potential crisis 
after the Philippine navy seized 20 Chinese fishermen and their boats near Mischief 
Reef, and after the Philippines published photographs showing that the PRC had been 
expanding its four-year-old constructions on the reef.   Michael Richardson, A Nervous 
ASEAN Will Approach China Over Expansion in Spratlys, INTL HERALD TRIB., Dec. 14, 
1998, at 4 (reporting on the seizure); Stein Tonnesson, Can Conflicts Be Resolved by 
Shelving Disputes?, 30 SECURITY DIALOGUE 2, 179-82 (1999) (reporting on the 
publication of Mischief Reef pictures).  Tonnesson writes:  
The Philippines assert, apparently with good reason, that the constructions on 
Mischief Reef are of a military nature and are transforming the reef into an 
artificial island.  The PRC alleges that the constructions are mere shelters for 
fishermen.  This second Mischief Reef crisis, however, did not provoke the same 
massive criticism of China from the side of the ASEAN countries as the first 
one did in 1995. . . .  [Moreover, after] the first Mischief Reef incident, the PRC 
. . . signed a code of conduct with the Philippines.  In accordance with [the 
code], there were bilateral talks in March 1999 between the PRC and the 
Philippines to defuse the crisis. 
Id.  See also China-Philippine Joint Declaration on the Framework for Bilateral 
Cooperation in the 21st Century, art. 9 (Beijing, May 16, 2000), available at 
http://www.isinolaw.org (reaffirming commitment to confidence building and 1995 
bilateral code of conduct). 
 62. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
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management arrangements, it has been willing to do so only on a 
bilateral, not multilateral, basis.63  In any bilateral negotiation with 
any one of the other Spratly claimants, of course, China seems to 
enjoy the advantage of being the more powerful country, and one 
might well be skeptical whether the outcome would be fair.  Some 
advocates of multilateral negotiation, however, have been unabashed 
in describing its main attraction in terms of the possibility of forming 
an ASEAN alliance against Chinathat is, of involving non-claimant 
countries like Indonesia and Thailand and perhaps even outside 
powers like the United States and Japan.64  Countering Chinese 
power has become a goal in itself, not finding a peaceful solution to 
the Spratly disputes.  Instead of recognizing the aggressiveindeed, 
to China, incendiarynature of these suggestions, these 
commentators have counted Chinas refusal to internationalize the 
South China Sea dispute as a sign of non-cooperation.65 
 The second example has to do with Taiwans role in the Spratlys.  
For better or worse, China has long secured commitments to the one 
China policy from ASEAN members, including the claimants to the 
Spratlys.66  If it werent for this fact,67 the South China Sea disputes 
would be even thornier than they are.  Yet apparently, not all U.S. 
commentators feel that their country is committed to the one China 
policy and some may be willing to see the Taiwan issue as an open 
one in the South China Sea as well.68  This introduction of the U.S. 
perspective evidences a failure to put themselves in the shoes of the 
claimants. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 63. See, e.g., VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 75, 76, 83. 
 64. Id. at 76.  
 65. Id.  
 66. See, e.g., ASEAN Annual Security Outlook 2001: China, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org; Sino-Philippine Joint Press Statement, art. 11 (May 16, 
2000), at http://english.peopledaily.com (reaffirming Philippine commitment to one 
China policy); Sino-Indonesian Joint Declaration on the Direction of Future 
Cooperation, art. 8 (May 8, 2000), available at http://www.isinolaw.org (reaffirming 
Indonesian commitment to one China policy); Sino-Malaysian Joint Declaration on the 
Framework for Future Cooperation, art. 5 (June 5, 1999), available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn (reaffirming Malaysian commitment to one China policy); 
Sino-Vietnamese Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation in the New 
Century, art. 10 (Dec. 25, 2000), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/6948.html 
(reaffirming Vietnamese commitment to one China policy, recognizing Vietnamese 
trade relations with Taiwan as of an unofficial nature). 
 67. One might suggest an additional reason why the legal status of Taiwan 
should not affect the Spratly disputes.  While Taiwan has occupied the island of Itu 
Aba since 1956, the government of Taiwan has staked out a general claim to the 
Spratlys on the basis of Chinas historical title.  Taiwanese independence, however, is 
precisely premised on the idea that the Taiwanese government is no longer a Chinese 
government in exile.  It might therefore seem inconsistent for Taiwan to claim 
independence and to make a general territorial claim to the Spratlys at the same time. 
 68. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 83.  
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 The third reason a power-politics-oriented discourse on the 
Spratlys might be inappropriate for exploring solutions to the conflict 
is its logical relation specifically to proposals for instituting 
multilateral management.  At best, highlighting potential conflicts in 
the South China Sea furnishes an inconclusive argument for the 
desirability of a Spratly multilateral regime.  Diplomatic measures 
aimed at conflict prevention come in a great variety of forms, and 
multilateral resource management is by no means prominent among 
them.  Either multilateral agreements directly addressing security 
issues, or even bilateral agreements on security or joint development, 
are much more likely alternatives.  At worst, a discourse highlighting 
the conflicts of interest among states serves to undermine, rather 
than reinforce, belief in the feasibility of multilateral regimes.  It is 
rarely the case that a country would put aside its national interest to 
engage in an international regime for the common good.  In fact, a 
recent study of five international resource management regimes 
explicitly rejects the hypothesis that regimes form when a shared 
conception of the common good [prevails] over national interest 
perspectives.69  In other words, one cannot rationally believe at the 
same time both in the existence of genuinely irreconcilable interests 
among nations and in a genuine possibility for an international 
regime constituting peaceful settlement among the same nations.  
Talk of Chinas inexorable advance only suggests strategies of 
containment.  It is inconsistent with advocacy for peaceful 
settlement of disputes.70  
 What the foregoing considerations suggest is that the prevalent 
discourse about security concerns in the South China Sea constitutes 
both an unreliable, and normatively unsound, basis for assessing the 
desirability and feasibility of multilateral resource management in 
the Spratlys.  What one would naturally want to know, then, is what 
a more reliable and cogent basis for such an assessment might be. 
 Given any proposal of ways to resolve the Spratlys disputebe it 
a proposal for allocating controls to individual countries, or a proposal 
for joint management schemesone can ask whether such a proposal 
might strike all of the claimant countries as equitable.  Suppose that 
a proposal that strikes all parties as equitable is available.  The 
significance of this is that, at least under certain conditions, the 
relevant parties might agree to implement the proposal, instead of 
pursuing their own interests at the expense of others.  Moreover, 
________________________________________________________________ 
 69. ORAN R. YOUNG & GAIL OSHERENKO, POLAR POLITICS: CREATING 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 240 (1993).  
 70. This is a basic objection to the way Valencia motivates his examination of 
proposals for allocation and joint management schemes: it is logically confused.  The 
language of inexorable advance is from Chapter VI (The Danger of the Status Quo). 
VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 130.  
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should they reach such an agreement, how they would behavewhat 
strategies they would pursuein the absence of such an equitable 
solution becomes irrelevant.  In other words, if we can find a solution 
to the Spratly disputes that is equitable, then we can advocate that 
solution while avoiding all the pitfalls involved in trying to predict 
what the claimant countries would do in a pure game of power. 
 What are the conditions under which different parties will agree 
to implement an equitable proposal instead of pursuing their own 
interests at the expense of others?  The following general answer 
seems plausible: no party should be considerably worse off under the 
agreement than if it pursued its interest without the agreement.  
Exactly what this means will become clearer in Part IV of this 
Article, where the equity of a particular proposal for joint 
management is considered.  There are certain principles of fairness 
that conceptually tie the notion of fairness to legitimate claims under 
international law.  As long as there is no great discrepancy between 
an individual partys allowable claims (by which the equitability of a 
solution is measured) and that partys interests (by which its well-
being is measured), then an equitable solution cannot make any party 
worse off.71  In particular, it will be explained in detail why China 
might find a multilateral management authority attractive, even if it 
is one under which, occasionally, the other claimant countries can 
form an alliance against China. 
 On the other hand, an equitable proposal need not make some of 
the parties significantly better off under the agreement than they 
would be without the agreement.  It is possible that some 
commentators advocating a comprehensive solution to the Spratlys 
dispute have painted a pessimistic, even alarmist, picture of what 
would happen if no such solution is reached, because they want to 
forestall the cynical objectionwhy bother coming up with such a 
solution, if no one is much better off under it than under the status 
quo?  That cynicism itself, however, may be based on an assumption 
that the issue must be a high priority on the agendas of all the key 
players in order to facilitate international regime formation.  A recent 
study of international environmental regimes has found such an 
assumption to be unsupported by empirical evidence.72 
 What the foregoing considerations suggest, in short, is that 
seeking fair solutions to international disputes need not be based on 
________________________________________________________________ 
 71. In other words, if, for each party to the Spratlys disputes, its significant 
interests are reflected in its allowable maritime and territorial claims, then the 
condition described in the text is likely to be fulfilled.  To put it slightly differently yet 
again, as long as there is no significant gap between a partys allowable claims and its 
interests, no significant gap should appear between the partys interests and what it 
gets under an equitable solution.   
 72. YOUNG & OSHERENKO, supra note 69, at 240-41.  
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the idealistic hope that countries will act altruistically at the expense 
of their self-interest.  Instead, what it requires is identifying 
situations where nations may be indifferent between the options of 
collaborating to achieve a fair solution, on the one hand, and fending 
for themselves in power politics, on the other.  In such situations, a 
successful argument for the fairness of particular solutions can 
significantly enhance their chances of being adopted. 
 Scholars who have recently proposed tentative solutions to the 
Spratlys dispute often give considerable prominence to the discourse 
on regional security.73  By contrast, they have not worked out the 
kind of detailed argument that is needed to defend the equitability of 
their proposed solutions.  If the foregoing line of reasoning is 
persuasive, however, scholarly priority should be just the reverse: it 
would be more fruitful to argue first, in a convincing manner, for the 
equity of particular solutions.  Of course, in addition to equity, one 
can try to demonstrate the efficiency of these particular solutions as 
well in terms of how the resources in the region might be explored, 
exploited, and conserved. 
 The rest of this Article will follow this strategy.  The most 
difficult part of the strategy is articulating criteria of fairness and 
efficiency to assess alternative proposals.  Part III attempts to tackle 
this topic. 
III.  THE MEANING OF A FAIR SOLUTION TO THE SPRATLY DISPUTES 
 As mentioned in the introduction, most commentators agree that 
the claimants to the Spratlys are unlikely to resort either to courts or 
arbitral tribunals to resolve their disputes.74  Solutions would thus 
have to take the form of direct settlements among the claimants.  In 
general, proposed solutions can be divided into two families.  One 
consists of proposals for allocating Spratlys features (islands, reefs, 
shoals, submerged banks, etc.) and maritime space to individual 
claimant countries, granting them exclusive jurisdiction over the 
allocated parts.  These are referred to below as proposals for 
allocating control.  The other family consists of proposals for setting 
up a joint development authority over a common area, though these 
proposals differ among themselves as to how that area is to be 
defined. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 73. See, e.g., VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, chs. IV, VI; Denoon & Brams, 
supra note 3, at 304-08, 313-14.  
 74. See, e.g., Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 316; VALENCIA ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 59-60.  
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 Choosing the most equitable and efficient solution from all 
solutions proposed requires, first, identifying criteria of equity and 
efficiency.  Even though the purpose of this Article is primarily to 
develop the idea of a Spratly joint management authority, this 
Section will first consider a few proposals for allocating control over 
the Spratlys, as this will gradually clarify the notion of an equitable 
solution.  Such clarification is crucial because the idea of equity has 
many interpretations.  A responsible argument for a fair solution will 
have to be clear about the interpretation of equity being applied and 
why that interpretation is more appropriate than others.  Some 
existing proposals for allocating control over the Spratlys employ very 
clear conceptions of equity, while others claim to be equitable but 
offer little justification.  
 With one important exception, the proposals for allocating 
control considered in this section have all been discussed by Valencia 
in Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea.75  The family of 
allocation proposals can in fact be further divided: one can either 
allocate the Spratly features alone or allocate maritime space as well 
as the features.  Proposals for allocating only Spratly features76 
present the following dilemma.  On the one hand, there is some 
agreement among commentators and even governments that none of 
the Spratly features can generate Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) or 
continental shelf zones.77  Many features may not even be able to 
generate a full 12-nm zone of territorial sea.78  If proposals for 
allocating Spratly features fail to allocate the maritime space around 
the features, however, they would not constitute a solution to the 
disputes in the region because it is the living and non-living resources 
in the region, and not just the Spratlys features per se, that are of 
vital importance to the claimants.  On the other hand, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that the international law of the sea may not 
allow even some of the Spratly features to generate full territorial 
waters, EEZs, and continental shelf zones.  Therefore, it is logically 
possible that an allocation of Spratly features could be the basis for 
allocating Spratly maritime space.  Even an expert who once 
________________________________________________________________ 
 75. See generally VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2.  
 76. Id. at 133-34. There are two main methods of allocation to be considered: 
(1) Starting from the present pattern of occupation, grant limited 
sovereignty to the occupants; 
(2) Adopt a system of rough equity, where China gets some of the features 
occupied by Vietnam and the Philippines, and all but two of the features 
it presently occupies.  Other claimants receive features closest to their 
coastlines.  
Id.   
 77. See id. at 41-45, and the sources cited in footnotes (e), (f), and (g) therein.  
 78. Id. at 47-48.  
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considered this possibility, howeverand who raised such puzzling 
questions as how to carry out maritime delimitation between an 
island and a rock79eventually came to the following conclusion: It 
is not proposed to explore the possibility of bilateral boundaries being 
drawn within the Spratly Region because I have no confidence that 
any of the countries are prepared to enter into negotiations that 
would produce such lines.80  Because of this inescapable dilemma, 
proposals for allocating control over Spratly features alone will be 
omitted in what follows. 
 Valencia describes five scenarios for allocating both features 
and maritime space in the Spratlys region.  There is an important 
allocation proposal in this category that he does not consider, which 
has been put forward by David Denoon and Stephen Brams.81  
Neither Valencia nor Denoon and Brams discuss at any length 
whether there are fundamental ways in which the approach of 
allocating control is superior to that of setting up a Spratlys 
multilateral authority.82  At least at the outset, this Article also will 
not be concerned with drawing this comparison.  The focus will 
instead be on the issue of how claims about the fairness of particular 
allocations of control can be defended. 
 The issue can be introduced by considering one of the five 
proposed scenarios Valencia describes for allocating control.  In this 
scenario, the Spratly features and maritime space are divided based 
on rough equity and realpolitik concerns.83  Valencia explains this 
as follows: 
This approach is designed to give each claimant a substantial 
sector. . . .  Dividing lines are drawn according to three factors: island 
occupation, natural spatial divisions between island clusters, and 
continental shelf claim limits. . . .  China would receive the majority of 
the land features, but the seabed of its maritime space has no 
hydrocarbon shows and only limited prospects for such. All other 
claimants receive areas of known hydrocarbon potential. . . .  The island 
and seabed awards thus tend to balance out to achieve a rough sense of 
equity.84 
 What is given here is a particular distribution of the goods 
associated with the Spratlys.  How is this distribution calculated and 
in what sense is it fair?  Is it fair because each of the five claimants 
prefers what it gets to what the others get?  Or is it that they derive 
________________________________________________________________ 
 79. PRESCOTT, supra note 7, at 36-39.  
 80. Id. at 36.  
 81. Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 310.  
 82. Id. at 315 (addressing this issue in passing, suggesting that (1) investors 
are likely to be leery of a multinational authority, and (2) that the political and 
managerial difficulties of making it work are daunting). 
 83. See Exhibit 1, infra. 
 84. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 144-45.  
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equal satisfaction from what they individually receive?  What 
assumptions about the preferences of the individual claimants are 
made and how are these assumptions justified?  And finally, which 
aspect of the bargain is equity and which part is realpolitik?  In 
fact, Valencia provides no answer to any of these questions, and it is 
difficult to infer what the answers might be.85 
 To reach fair solutions to international disputes clearly requires 
more careful consideration.  In contrast to the proposal just described, 
Denoon and Brams proposal is especially noteworthy for employing a 
notion of equity that has received rigorous elaboration. 
A. The Adjusted-Winner Procedure and Its Application to the Spratlys 
 Denoon and Brams work is an application of a procedure for fair 
division, called adjusted-winner, that forms part of the contribution 
Brams and Alan Taylor have made to theoretical studies of problems 
of fair division.86  As with other procedures of fair division, in 
adjusted-winner the fairness of the outcome is guaranteed by the 
procedure utilized to reach the result.  
 A basic feature of the adjusted-winner procedure of fair division 
(adjusted-winner) is its recognition that, faced with a situation of 
fair division, people often attach different values to the items to be 
divided or different importance to the issues to be settled.87  In this 
respect, adjusted-winner is analogous to the well-known device of 
cake cutting.88  In the classic cake-cutting procedure between two 
persons, A and B, A divides the cake into two pieces, and B chooses 
first.89  Since A is the second to choose, she has incentive to divide the 
cake into two pieces that she regards as equal, so as to ensure that 
the piece she gets will be at least as good as the other.90  Since B 
chooses first, the piece he gets will also be, in his eyes, at least as 
good as the other.91  If each party acts rationally, therefore, the 
procedure is guaranteed to generate a result that is envy-free.92  
________________________________________________________________ 
 85. If the claimants had brought the dispute to a court, or to an arbitral 
tribunal, and if the court or tribunal had issued a verdict prescribing the division that 
Valencia envisions here, then we could at least try to infer the tribunals reasoning and 
assumptions from the way the claimants had presented their case, relevant 
international law, and so on.  See generally VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2. 
 86. See generally STEPHEN BRAMS & ALAN TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION: FROM CAKE-
CUTTING TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1996), cited in Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 
326 n.19. 
 87. BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 65. 
 88. Id. at 8. 
 89. Id. at 9. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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Compare this with a procedure where an impartial third party 
attempts to divide the cake equitably.93  If the third person does not 
have adequate information about A and Bs preferences, an equitable 
division in the third persons eyes may well fail to be envy-free for A 
and B.94 
 Even though cake cutting can secure an envy-free result, it can 
be inequitable in an obvious sense: while A regards the two pieces of 
the cake as equal, B may prefer one to the other.  B is therefore likely 
to derive more satisfaction from the procedure.  Moreover, it has been 
shown that cake cutting can be inefficient, in the sense of not being 
Pareto-optimal.95  These and other problems with cake cutting led 
Brams and Taylor to the design of the adjusted-winner procedure, 
which they showed to produce results that are envy-free, equitable (in 
the sense of producing equal satisfaction), and Pareto-optimal.96   
 The procedure works in the following way.  In the case of two 
equal claimants, a list of the goods to be divided is first drawn up, 
and both parties are allowed an equal number of points, say, one 
hundred.97  Each party then secretly prepares a list showing how 
much they value each of the disputed items, ranking the items by 
allocating the one hundred points among them.98  Both parties then 
submit these bids to a neutral arbiter, who rules on the results.99  
Initially, a party wins the items that she has ranked higher than the 
other has.100  Ties are awarded to the party with fewer points from 
clear wins.101  By this time, one party usually will have won more 
points than the other, and the results are inequitable.  To restore 
equitability, the process of adjusting is then applied.102  Items with 
the lowest ratios of winner-to-loser points are given back to the loser, 
until winner and loser have an equal number of points.103  Givebacks 
may have to be partial in order to achieve this final result.104  One of 
the giveback items may therefore have to be divisible.105 
________________________________________________________________ 
 93. Id.  
 94. This is always a danger with divisions (e.g., of marital property) 
determined by judges and arbitrators. 
 95.  A Pareto-optimal allocation is one where there is no other allocation that is 
strictly better for at least one player and as good for all others.  BRAMS & TAYLOR, 
supra note 86, at 44. 
 96. Id. at 70-71. 
 97. Peterson, infra note 108, at 285. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 69. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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 The procedure can be modified to work for two claimants whose 
claims are unequal as well: one party will simply start with more 
points than the other.  The result will be equitable in the sense that 
the parties receive points proportional to the strengths of their 
claims.  Overall, therefore, the sense in which the adjusted-winner 
procedure is fair and efficient is perfectly transparent. 
 Not surprisingly, in order to apply such a simple procedure to the 
problem of allocating control in the Spratlys, Denoon and Brams have 
had to make very strong assumptions.106  While challenging these 
assumptions can prove an easy exercise, it should be noted that it is 
equally easy to miss what is interesting about Denoon and Brams 
idea.  Denoon and Brams intend merely to offer illustrations of how 
the adjusted-winner procedure might be applied to resolve the 
Spratlys dispute.107  Quarrels with the details of their illustrations, 
therefore, do not show that there cannot be more appropriate 
applications.  But more importantly, even if it does turn out that 
there is no plausible way of applying adjusted-winner to the Spratlys, 
we should still keep in mind the special promise the proposal has held 
outnamely, that it envisions a solution based on fairness (and 
efficiency), and not on the basis of the current or predicted balance of 
power.  Once achieved, solutions of this kind will be particularly 
stable. 
 Two of Denoon and Brams explicit assumptions are particularly 
strong, and therefore require special examination.  First, unlike cake 
cutting and some other procedures for fair division,108 adjusted-
winner actually does not work for more than two players, and there 
are five claimant countries to the Spratlys.109  To sidestep this 
difficulty, Denoon and Brams propose that we regard the conflict as, 
for the moment, one between China and ASEAN (with ASEAN being 
considered as a single player).110  They write, 
We think this view is realistic as a first step in resolving the overall 
dispute. China is by far the largest single claimant, against which the 
ASEAN countries have formed an implicit coalition. . . .  Later we will 
indicate how the ASEAN countries might, internally, settle their own 
competing claims.111   
________________________________________________________________ 
 106. See generally Denoon & Brams, supra note 3. 
 107. See id.  
 108. The number of additional players these procedures accommodate differs.  
Cake-cutting can theoretically accommodate any number.  Ivars Peterson, Formulas 
for Fairness: Applying the Math of Cake Cutting to Conflict Resolution, SCI. NEWS, May 
4, 1996, at 284.  See generally H.P. YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).  
 109. These include China/Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Brunei.  
 110. Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 318.  
 111. Id. 
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 While this proposed simplification might have had the 
appearance of being realistic in the mid-1990safter the ASEAN 
Regional Forums collective criticism of China in 1995 for the latters 
forceful occupation of Mischief Reef112it is an assumption unable to 
withstand scrutiny, then or now.  To begin with, what does it mean to 
say that China is the largest single claimant?  If the assertion is 
that China has the strongest claims to the Spratlys, then it 
reasonably will be denied by the other claimant countriesin 
particular, by Vietnam and the Philippines.  On the other hand, if the 
assertion is simply that China is the most powerful country among all 
the claimants (and has made the most expansive claims), then it 
might be true, but irrelevant.  Why should we regard a procedure as 
fair that gives weight not to the legitimate claims of the interested 
parties, but to their sheer size and strength?  Moreover, Denoon and 
Brams use of the label ASEAN countries for the four claimants to 
the Spratlys besides China is itself telling.  The justification of the 
label is presumably that, in the mid-1990s, there was a consensus 
among ASEAN countries in protesting Chinas occupation of Mischief 
Reef.113  Yet to import this ASEAN coalition into a process of fair 
division of the Spratlys seems again to elude the crucial distinction 
between the just resolution of international disputes, on the one 
hand, and international strategic alliance on the other. 
 Even more critically, the two-party set-up also implies a strong 
degree of homogeneity of interest among the other claimants to the 
Spratlys besides China114these other claimants must be able to 
agree on a unified bid in the adjusted-winner procedure against 
China.  The differences in the nature of the governments of these 
countries, their different economic interests, and the geographical 
separation of the sub-regions of the Spratlys to which individually 
they are interested in making claims all suggest that indeed this is 
highly unrealistic.115  This is likely to be the objection to Denoon and 
Brams first assumption that is most difficult to counter.  Otherwise 
we would have a general algorithm for reducing multiple player 
________________________________________________________________ 
 112. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 79-82.   
 113. See id. at 81, 87, 97. 
 114. Denoon and Brams acknowledge that Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia 
in fact do not have claims in the Spratlys.  Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 326 n.15. 
 115. This point can be made in Denoon and Brams own terms.  As will be 
discussed below, they consider six scenarios for the application of adjusted-winner, 
resulting from the combination of three bidding strategies on the part of China and two 
bidding strategies for ASEAN. It turns out that in none of these scenarios does 
ASEAN win both the Eastern region (presumably of the strongest interest to the 
Philippines) and the Southwest region (presumably of the strongest interest to 
Vietnam).  This seems good reason to believe that the ASEAN countries will not 
agree on either of Denoon and Brams two proposed bidding strategies.  See generally 
id. 
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situationsto which the adjusted-winner procedure cannot applyto 
situations that allow the procedures application.  We could simply 
separate off one player, C, from the rest, assess Cs claims against the 
others claims collectively, make differential (or equal) initial 
assignments of total points to C and to the rest collectively on the 
basis of this assessment, run the adjusted-winner procedure, and 
reiterate the whole process for the non-C parties to divide what they 
collectively received during the previous round.  Presumably, this 
application of adjusted-winner is invalid, and one cannot make it 
valid simply by labeling the non-C parties ASEAN. 
 The second crucial assumption Denoon and Brams make to get 
the adjusted-winner procedure going is a division of the Spratlys into 
five zones for the two players (China and ASEAN) to bid on.116  
Certainly, the specific division they offer is strictly for illustrative 
purposes, and there is no point disputing its details.  The division 
does raise a more general issue, however.  For adjusted-winner to 
apply in any context, the parties must agree in advance on a list of 
separate items upon which to bid.  Generally, that is to say, the 
employment of adjusted-winner comes only at the end of complex 
negotiations.117  Suppose we ask, however, on what terms this 
preceding negotiation could have been conducted.  One can contrast 
two extreme possibilities.  On the one hand, all parties may have 
relatively clear ideas about the economic, military, strategic, 
symbolic, and other significancefor themselvesof various sub-
regions of the Spratlys.  Through further articulation in the 
negotiation process, they may then be able to arrive at a detailed 
partition of the region, employing criteria that may be complex to the 
inexpert eye, much as countries now negotiate trade agreements or
to invoke a kind of case where the adjusted-winner procedure is taken 
to have the most promising applicationas spouses on the verge of 
divorce can identify the significant pieces of marital property to be 
divided.118  On the other hand, the parties may have no such clear 
idea about their preferences at all.  What they have instead are 
general and strong intentions to protect their own interests, but these 
are not matched by the ability to articulate possible trade-offs among 
different disputed items.  One reason why this might be the case, of 
course, is that the parties conflicting interests cannot be captured by 
________________________________________________________________ 
 116. Id. 
 117. This is how the role of adjusted-winner was conceived by Brams and Taylor 
in the first place.  See Peterson, supra note 108, at 285 (The negotiation literature 
already contains a great deal of material on identifying crucial issues, articulating 
them, and splitting them up properly.  Once youve done the hard work of defining the 
issues, then something like the adjusted-winner procedure can kick in to complete the 
process, [Alan] Taylor says.). 
 118. See generally id.  
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the nature of the disputed items at all.  Instead, the conflict might be 
the product of nationalistic sentiment and suspicion about the 
intentions of other parties.  Alternatively, the parties may simply not 
have had sufficient opportunity to develop a clear view of the valences 
of the items in question.  Whatever the reason, it is hard to see how 
parties under this second possibility could successfully conclude the 
negotiations that are prerequisite to applying the adjusted-winner 
procedure. 
 The question, then, is which of these two possibilities more 
closely characterizes the Spratlys dispute.  It is certainly not 
unthinkable that China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others in fact 
have already developed very detailed assessments of the Spratlys 
sub-regions.  This is not, however, what is generally presumed to be 
the case.  Instead, as shown in Part II, the claimantsChina, 
especiallyhave been seen as acting aggressively but in pursuit of 
highly non-specific, unstructured, and simplistic goals.119  China, for 
example, is often depicted as simply wanting to dominate the 
region.120  And generally, the claimants actions are more often 
interpreted as attempts at preempting the actions of others or as 
encroaching on others claims, than as aimed at satisfying 
independent goals of their own.121 
 This general presumption appears to underlie Denoon and 
Brams own discussion.  In hypothesizing about the nature of China 
and the ASEAN countries respective preferences for the various 
demarcated zones of the Spratlys, they mention the following 
possibilities: 
[1] China seeks to establish firmly its sovereignty in the region but 
minimize antagonisms with the ASEAN countries . . . [2] China seeks to 
secure bases in the North Central, South, and Southwest as a means to 
project its power throughout the entire region . . . [3] China seeks to 
control the zones with the most promising hydrocarbon deposits . . . [4] 
ASEAN avoids intruding on the zones closest to China while making 
strong bids for [areas that] have the greatest economic potential . . . [5] 
ASEAN tries to force China into noncontiguous zones, thereby 
impeding Chinas political-military control over the entire South China 
Sea.122 
If China has overwhelming goals that are nonetheless as disparate as 
[minimizing] antagonism and [projecting] its power throughout the 
entire region, or if ASEAN has strong but disparate goals such as 
seizing the greatest economic potential and impeding Chinas 
military-political control, it is difficult to see how they would be able 
________________________________________________________________ 
 119. See discussion supra Part II. 
 120. See, e.g., VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 77-99. 
 121. See id. at 82-83 (discussing hypotheses for Chinas behavior). 
 122. Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 319-21.  
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to arrive at sufficiently specific trade-offs among these goals to 
successfully engage in negotiation.  
 In short, it would appear that the applicability of adjusted-
winner to the Spratlys dispute has to assume that the general 
presumption just described is wrong.  Otherwise, the negotiations 
required before the procedure could come into play could never be 
completed.  This observation might be supported from a slightly 
different angle.  Adjusted-winner, like other procedures of fair 
division, must be protected from manipulation in order to generate 
fair results.123  This is because one party might try to anticipate the 
other partys rankings and bid in ways that deliberately skew the 
results.124  Such strategic uses of the procedure are less likely to 
occur when information about the other partys intentions is hard to 
obtain.125  If the claimants to the Spratlys conceive of their 
preferences in nonspecific and unstructured ways (e.g., largely on the 
basis of nationalistic sentiment), however, there will be less insider 
information, so to speak, to be had about each partys intentions.  
Therefore, the current general presumption about the nature of the 
claimants interests in the Spratlys implies both that the negotiations 
prior to the application of adjusted-winner would be difficult to carry 
out and that the procedure itself is likely to be vulnerable to 
manipulation. 
 On the basis of the two foregoing assumptionsthat the Spratly 
claimants can be divided into two opposing groups and that the two 
groups would be able to complete the preliminary divisions of the 
Spratly region for subsequent biddingDenoon and Brams proceed to 
construct three bidding strategies for illustrative purposes for China 
and two bidding strategies for ASEAN, and then to derive six 
corresponding outcomes of the adjusted-winner procedure.126  All of 
these outcomes give both sides between 65 percent and 83 percent of 
what they are assumed to prefer.127  As the discussion in the 
preceding paragraphs shows, however, the two assumptions Denoon 
________________________________________________________________ 
 123. Peterson, supra note 108, at 285. 
 124. Id.  
 125. If we combine this condition with the previous one, namely that the parties 
must know enough about their own preferences to have negotiated an agreement on 
what the disputed items are, we might say that adjusted-winner works best when each 
party has a lot of insider information.  See generally id. 
 126. See generally Denoon & Brams, supra note 3. 
 127. Id. at 322-23.  The only substantive feature of these outcomes that we 
should note is that in five out of six scenarios, one of the five demarcated zones has to 
be shared between the two players.  Denoon and Brams suggest that sharing would 
involve a production and revenue-sharing agreement, but do not say how jurisdictional 
issues would be resolved.  It seems, therefore, that sharing is simply multilateral 
joint development on a smaller scale.  This in turn suggests that whatever reservations 
Denoon and Brams have about the idea of multilateral authority for the whole of the 
Spratlys may not be insurmountable.  See generally id. 
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and Brams make are highly contentious.  Without some serious 
argument, one can rely neither on the idea of a natural division of the 
Spratlys disputants into two groups, nor that the disputants have 
detailed conceptions about the values represented by the Spratlys 
sub-regions.  Weakening these two assumptions, however, threatens 
to undermine the applicability of the adjusted-winner procedure in 
this context. 
B.  Fairness and International Law 
 Does this mean that it is futile to strive for a fair solution to the 
Spratlys dispute?  Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow.  
Consider again the difficulties raised earlier regarding Denoon and 
Brams second assumption.  In fact, the claimants to the Spratlys are 
probably not characterized by either of the two extreme possibilities 
citedthat they have highly specific views about the value of sub-
regions and potential trade-offs among them or that they have only 
non-specific, unstructured goals in mind.  The truth probably lies 
somewhere in between.  The claimant parties probably have given 
some consideration to the economic potential of natural resources in 
the region, the strategic significance of the current pattern of 
occupation, symbolic meanings that can give rise to domestic political 
pressure, and so on.  Yet their preferences regarding these issues are 
likely to be incomplete.  This does not mean, however, that all that 
the parties have left are general considerations about regional 
security and the balance of power.  There is clearly another 
dimension along which they may be prepared to articulate their 
viewsnamely, regarding what they think they are entitled to under 
international law.  Indeed, it is likely that the parties attach much 
significance to their potential legal claims.  For example, one can 
imagine Malaysia and Brunei being attached to the potential rights 
granted to them by the international law concerning EEZs and the 
continental shelf, even if they currently do not have specific plans for 
exploring the resources lying within these zones.  Similarly, Vietnam 
and China may regard as an important fact that the international 
law of territorial acquisition tends to reward the kind of exploration 
and occupation they have made in the Spratlys.  
 These considerations of legal entitlements are distinctive in a 
number of ways.  Compared with typical modes of thinking about 
balance of power and regional security, they are much more specific 
and structured.  For instance, they are more likely to motivate 
drawing distinctions among different sub-regions of the Spratlys.  On 
the other hand, because each partys considerations of international 
legal entitlement draw from a public discourse, they are more 
predictable than each partys individual calculation of the economic, 
political, and other utility of the region.  This follows from the most 
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important characteristic of international legal considerationsone 
that sets them apart from both specific utility calculations and 
general strategic considerationsnamely, that international norms 
are already incorporated into these considerations.  How China, for 
example, calculates the value of the natural resource potential in the 
Spratlys is, one might argue, Chinas own business.  How it goes 
about deciding what counts as its sovereignty territory, or how it sets 
up its baselines, by contrast, is not just its own business, but is 
everyones.  Similarly, one can only hope that China does not intend 
to dominate the South China Sea, but it might perhaps also be 
understandable why it might think that it has no choice but to do so, 
if the alternative is being hemmed in by a number of potentially 
unfriendly states.  What would be much more difficult to understand 
is if China made the claim that its territorial waters extended not 
twelve but hundreds of miles.128  
 All this is quite obvious.129  Its relevance is as follows.  Suppose 
it is agreed that the application of existing international law by itself 
will not resolve the Spratlys dispute.  The possibility remains that 
one can articulate certain principles of fairness on the basis of 
existing international law that are at the same time (1) specific 
enough to be applied in the Spratlys context and (2) independent of 
the individual countries specific utility calculations.  If such 
principles can be found, then they can guide us in assessing proposals 
either for allocating control or for setting up joint development 
schemes in the region.130  The following principle, (P), seems a 
plausible candidate of this type: 
In any fair settlement of the Spratlys dispute, no party should be asked 
to sacrifice its legitimate claims either without a similar sacrifice on the 
part of all other parties, or without adequate compensation. 
 The term in this statement of principle most in need of 
clarification is legitimate claims.  Legitimate (or, alternatively, 
allowable) claims means those claims that are supported by facts 
and international law.  For example, a claim to absolute sovereignty 
over a group of islands, made on the basis of historical title, and in 
________________________________________________________________ 
 128. Cf. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 15, arts. 
3, 4.  
 129. Consider the application of adjusted-winner to the division of marital 
property.  It is divorce law that determines who can participate in the division (i.e., the 
spouses, not the spouses and their friends and allies), and what the terms of 
participation are (equal).  It is within the context of these legal norms that adjusted-
winner operates to achieve envy-free settlements, equal satisfaction, and efficiency.   
See generally Peterson, supra note 108. 
 130. The relevant principles of fairness in adjusted-winner are envy-freeness 
and equal (or proportional) satisfaction.  Their application, however, depends (as has 
been suggested earlier) on (1) there being only two players, and (2) the players being 
relatively clear and certain about their preferences.  Id. 
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the face of competing claims, is in all likelihood illegitimate.  It has no 
support in international law, under which historical title is only one 
consideration to be balanced against others.131  A claim to sharing 
control of certain resources on the basis of historical title, by contrast, 
may be legitimate.132 
 To illustrate the application of this principle, return to some of 
the proposals for allocating control in the Spratlys that Valencia has 
advanced.  Among the five scenarios described, the first two are 
variations on the same idea (see Exhibits 2 and 3): 
(1) Allocation of the entire South China Sea and its features by 
equidistance lines from claimed or approximated coastal 
baselines, ignoring the Spratly and the Paracel islands; and 
(2) Allocation of the entire South China Sea and its features by 
equidistance lines from claimed or approximated coastal 
baselines ignoring the Spratlys but giving the Paracel features 
full effect as Chinese territory.133 
Under these proposals, the entire South China Sea is allocated, with 
each claimant exercising exclusive jurisdiction over the part it 
receives.  The result is partially to grant Malaysia and Brunei 
exclusive maritime jurisdiction over areas they have never claimed
that is, areas beyond their 200-nm EEZs and geographical 
continental shelves.134  All of these areas have instead been claimed 
by Vietnam, China, or the Philippines.135  Under the two proposals, 
although the Philippines does not receive all the areas it claims in the 
________________________________________________________________ 
 131. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 22-23. 
 132. An abstract consideration of the compatibility of fairness with territorial 
and maritime claims made under existing international law is the following: An 
important precondition for parties to reach a fair agreement is that the parties do not 
make claims that are irreconcilable.  That is, for no party involved is it the case that, 
should it give any weight to the claims of others, it would have to relinquish its own 
claims.  Only when claims are not irreconcilable can there be a solution that all 
perceive to be equitable.  Clearly, some claims to the Spratlys are irreconcilable with 
others, such as claims to unconditional sovereignty based on historical title and 
unmitigated by contemporary international law.  By contrast, most claims to 
sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction based on international law governing territorial 
acquisition and on the Law of the Sea can be reconciled, in the sense that appropriate 
weight is given to all legitimate claims.  It could be the case, of course, that after all 
legitimate claims are accorded appropriate weight, it is found that no ones claim 
prevails over the others.  This is in fact just what legal scholars have recently 
concluded after applying international law to the various claims to the Spratlys.   This 
is why restricting claims to legitimate ones does not by itself guarantee finding an 
equitable solution that does justice to all these claims.  Cf. supra notes 1-3 and 
accompanying text. 
 133. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 143-44.  
 134. Id. at 140-46. 
 135. Id. at 134-46. 
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Spratlys, it receives a majority of them. 136  By contrast, Vietnam 
loses much and China loses almost all of the areas to which they lay 
claim in the Spratlys.137  This is partly because of the gratuitous 
gift to Malaysia and Brunei and partly because where China and 
Vietnams claims conflict with the claims of the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Brunei, China and Vietnams claims are given no 
weight.138 
 The violation of principle (P) is clear.  China and Vietnams 
claims on the basis of historical title and effective occupation clearly 
have some force under international law and cannot simply be 
ignored.139  Proposals (1) and (2) are thus inequitablethey are not 
based on the legitimate claims of the parties contemplating an 
agreement, and they in fact deny some of these legitimate claims. 
 A different basic objection to proposals (1) and (2) is that they 
have no basis in international law, under which the equidistance 
principle is applied for the purpose of boundary delimitation with 
respect to EEZ and continental shelf claims.140  The principle is not 
supposed to be used to extend any countrys maritime jurisdiction 
beyond its EEZ and continental shelf claims.141  Proposals (1) and (2) 
thus amount to a complete rejection of a fundamental tenet of 
international law of the seanamely, that there are areas of the sea 
(e.g., those defined as the high seas) that do not belong to any one 
country but belong to a regional or global commons.142 
 Either of these two objections may seem sufficient to disqualify 
proposals (1) and (2) from serious consideration.  Another pair of 
Valencias proposals, however, is subject only to the first objection, 
________________________________________________________________ 
 136. This is because the Philippines made a claim to the Spratlys beyond what 
EEZ or continental shelf principles would justify. The Philippine claim began with 
Tomas Clomas 1956 declaration to have discovered the Spratlys when they had 
allegedly been res nullius (in 1947); the claim continued through Ferdinand Marcos 
Presidential Decree in 1978 proclaiming the Kalayaan Island Group to be part of the 
Philippines; and it was embodied in two draft bills in the Philippine senate from 1987 
and 1990.  Of all existing claims to the Spratlys, it is probably most difficult to predict 
how the Philippine claim would be treated under international legal authority.  This 
issue is further discussed in the Appendix.  For discussions of the Cloma claim, see 
VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 33-35; AUSTIN, supra note 1, 152-54.  For discussion 
of Presidential Decree 1596 and the two senate bills, see PRESCOTT, MARITIME 
JURISDICTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 18-21; PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF 
NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 6, at 31-34. 
 137. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 143-44. 
 138. Id. 
 139. For a discussion of the strength of Chinas claims to the Spratlys as 
compared to the claims of other countries, see AUSTIN, supra note 1, ch. V.  
 140. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 49-50. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 39-59. 
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(3) Allocation of the South China Sea and features on the basis of 
equidistance lines out to the limit of the countries 200 nm EEZs 
and their geographical continental shelves, ignoring both the 
Spratly and Paracel features; 
(4) Allocation of the South China Sea and features on the basis of 
equidistance lines out to the limit of the countries 200 nm EEZs, 
and their geographical continental shelves, ignoring the 
Spratlys, but giving the Paracels full effect as Chinese 
territory.143 
 Proposals (3) and (4) acknowledge that there is rarely basis in 
international law to extend maritime jurisdiction beyond the 200-nm 
limit.144  They both leave a high seas area in the middle of the South 
China Sea, even if there is no shown hydrocarbon resource in that 
area.  Suppose that this area is taken to be a regional commons and 
subjected to some form of joint management authority.145  Could 
these proposals be taken as a basis for settling the Spratlys dispute?  
As is clear from the foregoing discussion, a form of inequity still 
remains: where China and Vietnams claims on the basis of historical 
title and effective occupation conflict with the claims of the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei on EEZ and continental shelf 
premises, the conflict is resolved in favor of the latter three countries 
with no compensation to the first two.  Therefore, principle (P) is 
again violated. Because of this inequity, we should not expect China 
and Vietnam to agree to these two proposals.  
 It is important to contrast the foregoing argument, that 
proposals (1) through (4) contain clear inequities, with an observation 
of a very different kind.  Under proposals (1) or (2), China is in fact 
excluded from all of the Spratlys features.  Even proposals (3) and (4) 
would greatly limit the areas that China would receive.  One might 
say that this is the most obvious reason why these proposals are 
inadequate: China would never accept them.  Such a remark, 
however, eludes a distinction of vital importance.  Chinas rejection of 
the proposals could be based on two completely different kinds of 
motivations: (1) it might simply have rejected what is unfair, as its 
legitimate claims would have been denied under the proposals; or (2) 
it might have believed that, as a powerful interested country, it could 
strike a better bargain.  It is unfortunate that very often, only the 
second motivation is attributed to China.146 
________________________________________________________________ 
 143. Id. at 144-45.  
 144. Id. at 145.  See infra Exhibits 4 and 5. 
 145. Such an elaboration of proposals (3) and (4) would be identical with one 
version of the joint management schemes to be discussed later.  See infra Part IV.  
 146. Denoon and Brams report that the idea behind proposals (3) and (4) was 
proposed informally by the Indonesians as a way to clarify questions of sovereignty and to 
minimize debate about procedures.  Although the doughnut solution has the merit of 
simplicity, it would . . . greatly [limit] the areas China would receive.  Not surprisingly, 
2003] MULTILATERAL MANAGEMENT AND SPRATLY DISPUTES 831 
 
C.  Fair Final Allocation v. Fair Participation 
 So far, (P), a principle of fairness that makes reference to 
international law, has seemed useful for assessing proposed solutions 
to the Spratly disputes: it has helped to show what is wrong with two 
allocation proposals (each with two variants).  Yet, although (P) has 
sufficient content to rule out some allocations as unfair, it is unlikely 
to lead to a discovery of the allocation that is most fair. 
 This is because the application of (P) involves looking for denials 
of legitimate claims that are not accompanied by adequate 
compensation.  On reflection, it seems that international courts or 
similar impartial tribunals would be positioned best to determine 
which territorial or maritime claims are legitimate under 
international law and to differentiate between degrees of 
legitimacy.147  Therefore, it seems that courts or similar impartial 
tribunals would be the most qualified to apply (P).  Yet, as mentioned 
earlier, probably no claimant country to the Spratlys would trust an 
international tribunal for a final resolution of the Spratly disputes.  
The explanation is that (P) is simply too weak and would still leave 
the tribunal with too much discretion in fashioning a final allocation.  
Thus, it must be admitted that no principle of fairness has yet been 
found that would solve the Spratly disputes with a fair final 
allocation. 
 We are by no means compelled, however, to conceive of fairness 
only in terms of what each party gets in the end.  In the study 
referred to earlier of international regime formation (based on 
investigation into five different international environmental regimes), 
researchers found that the equity of an international regime is a 
necessary condition for its formation.148  Yet, interestingly, at the 
same time, there is evidence that for an international regime 
successfully to form or remain effective, participants should neither 
have certainty about the distributional consequences of the regime 
(e.g., the material benefits as compared with cost), nor attempt to 
bargain directly in terms of these consequences.149  Some of the 
regimes studied deliberately created a veil of uncertainty to make it 
                                                                                                                      
Beijing rejected the idea.  Denoon & Brams, supra note 3, at 315.  Denoon and Brams thus 
ignore the possibility that the Indonesian suggestion was unfair to China.  Id. 
 147. Such determinations may take into account scholarly legal analyses similar 
to that by Greg Austin, Mark Valencia, and others.  See generally AUSTIN, supra note 1; 
VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-4.  
 148. Specifically, the hypothesis confirmed was that bargaining to set up a 
multilateral regime cannot succeed unless it produces an outcome that participants 
can accept as equitable, even when the adopting of equitable formulas require some 
sacrifice in efficiency. YOUNG & OSHERENKO, supra note 69, at 235-36. 
 149. Id. at 238-39.  
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difficult for individual participants to foresee how the operation of 
institutional arrangements will affect their interests over time.150  
Conversely, in other situations where the costs and benefits of 
participating [were] relatively easy to compute, regimes failed to 
form or became less effective.151  These findings suggest that 
countries make judgments about fairness on bases other than 
distributive outcomes. 
 These findings about international regimes are, in one way, 
completely unsurprising: they merely echo what we know about 
distributive justice in domestic contexts.  What is basic to our 
thinking about distributive justice within one national polity are not 
considerations of what each citizen gets in the end, but whether 
citizens have a fair share in the ongoing social process that 
determines individual allocations, including the democratic political 
process governing redistribution.  Without knowing whether what we 
each get in the end really is fair, we focus on issues like whether 
dominant social institutions advance the interests of all citizens, 
whether citizens interests are adequately represented in the political 
process, and whether fundamental rights and liberties are protected 
(so that not everything is up for grabs through political contest) in 
order to decide whether we live in a just society.152  It is these indicia 
of fair participation, and not any particular distributive result, that 
assure us the allocation of the benefits of social cooperation is 
equitable. 
 Analogously, in the international context, when parties with 
legitimate claims to the same resources find it difficult to arrive at a 
fair final division of these resources, they may well be motivated to 
enter into joint management of these resources because it is easier for 
them to agree on what fair participation in joint management 
requires.  This is a general reason why multilateral management can 
be attractive.  And, given the preceding arguments in this Section, it 
constitutes a powerful reason for Spratly claimants to consider a joint 
management authority in the South China Sea.  Part IV considers 
what fair participation in the joint management of the Spratlys could 
look like. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 150. Id. at 13. 
 151. Id. at 238 (suggesting that de[-]emphasizing or avoiding distributive issues 
enhances the ability of the participants to engage in a search for mutually beneficial 
solutions, and that, in addition to creating the veil of uncertainty, one should strive 
to [expand] the contract zone). 
 152. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. 1999) (1969).  
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IV. A JOINT MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY 
 The most fundamental issue for any proposal for multilateral 
management in the Spratlys is the definition of the area to be 
governed by the multilateral regime.  Only after deciding this issue 
can one consider questions about the structure of the organization 
and how power is to be distributed among participants.  Valencia 
describes four major possibilities for defining the shared management 
area,153 yet, as mentioned in the introduction, he does not discuss the 
relative merits of these distinct alternatives, nor does he suggest how 
to choose among them.  Advocates for any one of the alternatives, 
therefore, would have to construct arguments on their own. 
 The first of the four alternatives is the following: 
(A) The area of shared management would be that area within the 
line equidistant between the Spratly features and undisputed 
national territory.154 
 Valencia attributes the idea of such a geographical line to Victor 
Prescott.155  The author of the Prescott line, however, apparently 
did not have a Spratly joint management authority in mind.  Instead, 
what Prescott proposes is merely to divide the South China Sea into 
two parts and consider them separately in examining the limits of 
national claims in the region.  He wrote: 
The first part consists of the continental margins and overlying seas 
that border the South China Sea adjacent to the claimant fringing 
states.  The second part consists of the remainder that comprises the 
seas and seabed attached to the Spratly Islands.  This division is made 
for the following reasons.  The margins are generally claimed from 
territories that are not in dispute; most of the international boundaries 
delimited on the margin will result from bilateral negotiations; there 
are significant areas of the margin that fringing states can claim 
without any objection from other states; all fringing states are already 
exploiting areas of their continental margins and adjacent seas; some 
bilateral boundaries have already been drawn and there are prospects 
that other delimitations will occur in the foreseeable future. In 
contrast, possessions in the Spratly region are disputed by at least 
three countries; . . . no boundaries have been delimited in this region; it 
is likely that any early solutions would involve multilateral 
________________________________________________________________ 
 153. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 205-06. 
 154. Id. at 205.  See infra Exhibit 6. 
 155. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 222.  Although Valencia and his 
colleagues do not state whether the undisputed national territory used to generate 
the Prescott line includes the Paracels, Prescotts presentation makes it clear that it 
does.  PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra note 6, 
at 17-19.  
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negotiations; . . . exploitation of the seas occurs on an ad hoc basis and 
there has been no significant exploitation of the seabed. . . . 
 The division between the two areas was defined in the following 
manner.  The outer most projections and islands of all states bordering 
on the South China Sea were identified.  The outermost islands, rocks, 
and occupied low-tide elevations of the Spratly Region were identified.  
A median line was drawn between these two sets of features on the 
British Admiralty Chart 1263.156 
It is not clear why the median line proposed by Prescott is the best 
way to divide the South China Sea into two regions characterized by 
the contrasting sets of features listed in the quoted passage.  
Conversely, once the line is drawn, it may not be clear that Prescotts 
explicit justification is adequate.  For example, according to a chart 
drawn by Valencia, for example, the Prescott line encloses large areas 
where only two countries hold competing claims157 and is therefore 
certainly not a delineation of areas subject to multiple (meaning more 
than two) claims.  This is just to say that the choice of the Prescott 
line for delineating the area for multilateral management requires 
further justification.  Indeed, providing such further justification is a 
major purpose of this Section. 
 Valencia does make one important argument for choosing the 
Prescott line, however.  He notes that the use of the median line 
here is unusual in light of international law.158  Because equidistant 
lines are usually drawn only between territories that can generate 
maritime zones, the Prescott line, in effect, pretends that the Spratly 
Islands as a group can generate their own maritime zones.159  When 
the Prescott line is used to demarcate an area for multilateral 
management, however, we might consider the novel creation as not 
really contradicting international law, as the maritime zones around 
the Spratlys are not generated on any countrys behalf.160 
 The other possibilities for delineating a joint management area 
are more straightforward: 
(B) The shared management area would be the area beyond 200 nm 
from legitimate coastal baselines, and beyond the legal limit of 
the coastal continental shelves.161 
This suggestion is identical with the idea behind proposals (3) and (4) 
in the previous Section:162 any part of the South China Sea that has 
not been allocated according to EEZ or continental shelf principles 
________________________________________________________________ 
 156. Id. at 4-6.  
 157. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 205.  See infra Exhibit 7. 
 158. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 205.   
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.  
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will be declared a regional commons and subjected to the regulation 
of a regional multilateral authority.163 
(C) [The] area of shared management would include only the area 
claimed by three or more entities, counting the claims of China 
and Taiwan as one.164 
Valencia calls this the multiple claim approach and notes that 
[this] approach would considerably narrow the area in question and 
leave disputes in areas outside the multiple claim area to be resolved 
by the claimants themselves.165 
(D) The area would be the area enclosed by connecting the 
outermost main islands, or alternatively, the outermost drying 
reefs in the Spratly group.166 
This fourth and final possibility thus comes in two versions: (D1) uses 
the outermost main islands in the Spratly group, while (D2) uses the 
outermost drying reefs, to delineate the joint management area.167 
 How might one go about comparing these different possibilities?  
With respect to each, we can ask: (1) how comprehensive is it as a 
solution to the major disputes in the Spratlys and (2) to what extent 
is it likely to be perceived as benefiting all parties? 
A.  Preliminary Rankings of Alternative Boundaries 
 Obviously, (A) forms the basis of a more comprehensive 
multilateral solution than (B), (C), or (D).  The only major South 
China Sea disputes left to bilateral solutions by (A) would be the 
disputes between China and Vietnam over the Paracels and between 
China and the Philippines over Scarborough Reef.  Another useful 
comparison along the dimension of comprehensiveness is between (C) 
and (D).  One version of (D), (D1), draws a line that encloses the 
outermost main islands in the Spratly group, thereby creating an 
area that is simply a sub-region of the area in (C).168  The other 
version of (D), (D2), draws a line that encloses the outermost drying 
reefs of the Spratlys, creating an area that largely overlaps with the 
area in (C).169  The non-overlapping areas jut into regions 
legitimately claimed by the Philippines and Malaysia in haphazard 
________________________________________________________________ 
 163. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 205-06. 
 164. Id. at 206. 
 165. Id.  See infra Exhibit 7. 
 166. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 206.   
 167. Id.  See infra Exhibits 8 and 9. 
 168. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 206.  See infra Exhibit 8. 
 169. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 206.  See infra Exhibit 9.   
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ways.170  Overall, each version of (D) is inferior to, or at least not 
superior to, (C) along the dimension of comprehensiveness. 
 Why should comprehensiveness matter?  The answer is two-fold.  
First, the more comprehensive the area of the joint management 
authority, the less need there will be for other kinds of solutions to 
the Spratly disputes.  When this is the case, multilateral 
management becomes a more salient solution to the regional 
disputes, and being perceived as a salient solution can in fact improve 
the chances of success.171  For example, (A) (the Prescott line) vitiates 
much of the need for bilateral negotiations that (C) (the multiple 
claim approach) creates.  Similarly, a multilateral regime based on 
(D) at best addresses the same range of disputes as (C) and may in 
fact address a smaller range.  Thus, (A) is more salient than (C), and 
(D) is at best as salient as (C).   
 Second, the larger the joint management area, the more there 
will be for participants in the multilateral regime to bargain over, 
and expanding the contract zone has been found to contribute to the 
success of bargaining in international regimes.172  Along the 
dimension of comprehensiveness, therefore, the following rankings 
obtain:  
(A) > (B); (A) > (C); (A) > (D); (C) > (D) 
 The second question that can be asked about the four 
possibilities is how likely each is to be perceived as benefiting all 
parties.  We may begin by observing that (B) implicitly grants all 
claimant countries exclusive jurisdiction over their EEZ and 
continental shelf zones, as well as grants them a share in the joint 
management of the common area.173  The effects on the claimants, 
however, are unequal.  While Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines 
do not hold claims to areas within China and Vietnams EEZs and 
continental shelf zones, Vietnam and China do hold competing 
claimsand occupy islands and featuresin the EEZs and 
continental shelf zones of those first three countries.174  Therefore 
under (B), Vietnam and China lose on all of their competing claims 
against Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and their occupied 
islands become a common area.  Because neither (A), (C), nor (D) 
implicitly grants exclusive maritime jurisdiction, and because (A) 
actually takes EEZ and continental shelf jurisdiction away from 
Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines, these three countries should 
________________________________________________________________ 
 170. Id. 
 171. This is one of the best-supported findings in the survey led by Young and 
Osherenko.  YOUNG & OSHERENKO, supra note 69, at 236-37. 
 172. Id. at 238-39.  
 173. See infra Exhibit 5.  
 174. Id.  
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find (B) the best option of the four.  For China, (B) represents the 
worst option.175 
 The preferences over (C) display an opposite pattern.  Because 
(C) leaves a number of bilaterally disputed areas between China, on 
the one hand, and Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei on 
the other,176 one might argue that China would strongly prefer (C).  
In this view, China has always endorsed the idea of joint development 
of resources in areas of maritime dispute, but it has resisted 
multilateral approaches in favor of bilateral approaches.177  Because 
(C) would leave more disputed areas of the South China Sea to 
bilateral resolution than (A) and (B), China should have a preference 
for it.  The other countries, however, especially the Philippines, wary 
of bilateral negotiations with a much stronger party, should most 
strongly reject (C).  Because the areas covered by (C) and (D) largely 
overlap, the pattern of preference surrounding (D) should be similar. 
 Reasoning in this manner, we can conjecture for each claimant 
country the following rankings of the four options (assuming the 
rough equivalence between (C) and (D)): 
 ● China:    ((C), (D)) > (A) > (B) 
 ● The Philippines:  (B) > (A) > ((C), (D)) 
 ● Vietnam:178     (A) > ((C), (D)) > (B) (?) 
 ● Malaysia:179    (B) > (A) > ((C), (D))  
 ● Brunei:   (B) > (A) > ((C), (D)) 
What this shows is that (B) (because of the low ranking by China), 
(C), and (D) (because of the low ranking by the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Brunei) have little chance of being perceived as benefiting all 
parties.  By contrast, (A) has a reasonable chance of being so 
perceived.  Thus, (A) dominates the other options along this second 
dimension, just as it does along the dimension of comprehensiveness. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 175. Vietnam at least manages to keep some resource-rich areas in the west 
Spratlys, whereas China suffers an all-out loss. 
 176. See infra Exhibit 7. 
 177. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 83.   
 178. Vietnams preference is the hardest to construct.  On the one hand, under 
(A) but not under (B), Vietnamese claims that overlap with the other countries EEZ or 
continental shelf claims are given weight.  On the other hand, under (B) but not under 
(A), Vietnam receives exclusive jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf areas.  
Comparison of (A) or (B) with (C) or (D) for Vietnam is also difficult.  However, for (A) 
to come out aheadas the text argues it doesit only has to be the case that (A) is not 
the worse option for Vietnam among all four.  And that seems plausible.    
 179. (B) is clearly the best option for Malaysia.  Valencia reports that Malaysia 
is not enthusiastic about multilateral joint development, especially in the area it 
claims. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 114.  The reason for this is not clear.  
However, since (A), (C), and (D) all imply multilateral joint development of Malaysia-
claimed areas, Malaysia may be indifferent between (C), (D), and (A). 
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B.  Ensuring Fairness 
 To say that option (A)delineating the joint management area 
along the Prescott lineis more likely than the other options to be 
perceived as benefiting all parties is not tantamount to saying that it 
is truly fair.  Yet fairness is probably a necessary condition for the 
success of international regime formation.  An unfair arrangement, 
even if otherwise most promising, is unlikely to resolve the Spratly 
disputes.  Therefore, more needs to be said about the fairness of a 
joint management authority within the Prescott line.   
 There are two relevant considerations.  First, recall principle (P), 
which says that no party should be asked to sacrifice its legitimate 
claims either without a similar sacrifice on the part of all other 
parties, or without adequate compensation.  If the Prescott line is 
used to circumscribe the joint management regime, then each 
claimant would surrender a significant amount of territory and 
maritime space it claims or occupies to be managed multilaterally.180  
And no countrys claims would be preempted by another countrys 
exclusive jurisdiction.  In other words, one could say either that the 
Prescott line maximizes the recognition of all countries legitimate 
claims, or that it minimizes the denial of these claims.  Prima facie, 
therefore, joint management authority within the Prescott line 
satisfies (P). 
 This conclusion is not beyond question, however.  Joint 
management within the Prescott line takes away from all countries, 
except China, areas that fall under their EEZ and continental shelf 
claims, and these claims are given great weight under international 
law.181  By contrast, because of Chinas greater distance from the 
Spratly Island group,182 China gives up much less in exchange for a 
share in the joint management authority. 
 This plausible objection can be countered by a second 
consideration.  While the geographical aspect of a joint management 
authority within the Prescott line favors China, other aspects of the 
authority can be structured to compensate for this difference.  Most 
importantly, the joint management authority could be made to 
enhance the bargaining power of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Brunei vis-à-vis China.  That is, a major good it delivers to these 
countries is the possibility of forming coalitions against China in the 
authoritys policy-making. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 180. No country of course will be expected to actually surrender their 
sovereignty and jurisdictional claims.  
 181. Compare infra  Exhibit 5 with infra Exhibit 6.  
 182. Or, to be more precise, the Paracel Islands greater distance.  See id.  
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 How might this be so?  The joint management authority, which 
from this point on is understood to cover the area within the Prescott 
line, will have certain general policy goals, a political structure to 
develop regulations and projects furthering these goals, as well as the 
capacity to implement the regulations and projects.  For now we are 
interested in just one of these constitutional issuesnamely, the 
political structure of the regime.  Two suggestions made by Valencia 
may help empower the weaker countries against China within a 
multilateral regime.  First, he considers different ways of allocating 
percentage shares of benefits and costs of operating the Spratly 
Management Authority.183  The allocation could be based on the 
extent of the original claims within the area . . . the length of 
coastline bordering the South China Sea, contributions to the 
Authority, or some combination of these considerations.184  
Allocation according to coastline lengths seems the most reasonable, 
Relying on the extent of original claims as a basis for share allocation 
raises several significant problems. . . .  First, the extent of the original 
claims of China/Taiwan and Vietnam is unclear, and second, countries 
could be tempted to argue that their original claims were more 
extensive than they actually were.  Because of these difficulties, shares 
might be allocated based on the claimants general directional coastline 
length on the South China Sea.  Under this approach, China and 
Taiwan together would receive about 31% of the governing shares, 
Vietnam 26%, the Philippines 21%, Malaysia 20% and Brunei 2%.  The 
major difference between these proportions and those based on the 
extent of original claims is that Chinas share would be reduced from 
52% to 31% while those of the Philippines and of Malaysia would be 
sharply increased.185 
Second, the same percentage allocation (according to coastline length) 
may be applied to distribute votes within the main decision body (a 
Council) of the Spratly Management Authority.186  According to 
Valencias calculation, in such an arrangement China alone would not 
be able to block the other countries from forming a two-thirds 
________________________________________________________________ 
 183. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2, at 210. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 213-14.  The authors go on to suggest that allocation according to 
coastline length would greatly [reduce] the incentive for China to participate.  Id.  
This is not necessarily the case, given that the Prescott line favors China from the 
start.  
 186. Id. at 214.  In a system of weighted voting where each country gets five 
general weights, and one hundred special weights (resulting in a total of 125 
weights) are allocated according to the coastline length, the following distribution 
would be the result: 
China/Taiwan  36 
Vietnam  31 
The Philippines  26 
Malaysia  25 
Brunei   7 
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majority.187  By contrast, even if China and Vietnam combine their 
votes, they would not form a two-thirds majority.188  In other words, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines would have sufficient room to 
defend their interestsby forming coalitionswhen the Council 
deliberates on substantive policies that require a two-thirds majority 
for approval. 
 Valencia discusses a further mechanism for protecting the 
special interest participants in joint management may have either in 
their EEZ and continental shelf zones, or in their traditionally held 
territory: dividing the joint management area into different sub-zones 
according to the pattern of competing claims and then assigning a 
special chamber of the Council of the Authority to each sub-zone.189  
For example, a zone that is characterized by overlapping claims by 
China, Malaysia, and the Philippines would be represented by a 
chamber in which China, Malaysia, and the Philippines can vote.190  
Suppose, for example, that it is harder for China to form a majority 
within such a chamber than it is within the Council.191  Then in a 
combined chambered system,namely, one in which a policy can be 
adopted only if it wins a majority both in the Council and in the 
chamber associated with that areaMalaysia and the Philippines are 
given greater protection.192 
 If a coalition against China were an explicit possibility within 
the joint management authority, would China still participate?  
Although China in the past has opposed multilateral processes for 
resolving the Spratly disputes precisely to avoid confronting an 
international coalition, the rationale for such an opposition may no 
longer exist in the context of a Spratly Management Authority.  First, 
the geographical boundary of the regime has already been determined 
(in Chinas favor), and it is most likely that China will share at least 
some of the benefits (and costs) of resource exploration under the 
regime.  Because not everything is up for grabs, China has less to lose 
in political contests within the authority.  More importantly, it would 
not have to fear the internationalization of this political process 
because the charter of the authority would presumably preempt the 
________________________________________________________________ 
 187. Id. at 215. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. The authors are not clear, however, about what it means to form a 
majority within a chamber.  They also do not explain how in a chamber where, say, 
only China and the Philippines sit, the Philippines can receive greater protection than 
it can in the Council.  As this last example illustrates, further discussion of chambered 
systems must explain how chambers can be prevented from being turned into sites for 
bilateral negotiation (which was partially what the multilateral regime was designed to 
avoid). 
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involvement of non-claimant countries, whether they are other 
ASEAN members or some outside power. 
C.  Self-Interested Indifference Between a Fair Solution and No 
Solution 
 Only one more issue remains to be considered.  Suppose that all 
the claimant countries are indeed persuaded that, as far as it goes, 
joint management within the Prescott line could be made into an 
equitable arrangement.  Does that go far enough?  Is the fairness of 
an arrangement sufficient motivation for anyone to participate in it?  
Is everyone really a lot better off under that arrangement than 
without the arrangement?  
 It was suggested in the Part II that to be embraced, a fair 
collaboration need not drastically improve participants well being, so 
long as it does not drastically diminish anyones well being.  That is, 
when a self-interested agentthe typical nation-state acting in the 
international arenafaces a choice between two situations, where (1) 
one situation involves entering into a fair arrangement with other 
parties, while the other involves refraining from such an 
arrangement; and (2) it is likely to be equally well (or badly) off in the 
two situations, then the agent may choose the fair arrangement. 
 There is reason to think that China, in particular, may face such 
a choice, supposing that its overall national power is bound to 
increase.  First, as Valencia points out, the Prescott line encloses 
most of the promising areas for hydrocarbon deposits in the South 
China Sea.193  Thus, even if China could assert historical title to 
maritime areas lying outside the Prescott line, it may have little 
incentive to insist on giving such title any weight in a peaceful 
settlement of the Spratly disputes.  Second, as long as China is 
guaranteed some significant share of the hydrocarbon resources in 
the Spratlys area, it may not matter much to China that it cannot 
always secure the most favorable terms in schemes of joint 
development. 
 This conclusion is supported by a certain view of Chinas general 
energy strategy.194  Suppose that the way for China to secure the 
maximum amount of energy resources for itself in the South China 
Sea is not to pursue a peaceful settlement in the form of a 
multilateral regime, but to wait for the development of its economic 
and military power.  It can try to dominate other neighboring 
countries in bilateral negotiations.  And it can plan eventually to 
________________________________________________________________ 
 193. Id. at 205. 
 194. The Author derives this view from Austins discussion.  AUSTIN, supra note 
1, ch. 9.   
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have the naval capacity to steal natural resource from the South 
China Sea. This approach carries a high cost both in terms of time 
and other resources.  A strong Chinese navy requires both time and 
scarce domestic economic resources to develop.  Bilateral negotiations 
may also proceed very slowly, so that China cannot, in the short-term, 
benefit from known hydrocarbon deposits in the area.  In short, for a 
long time to come, China will not benefit from this expansionist 
strategy in the South China Sea, and the resources in the region will 
remain largely unexplored. 
 During this time, however, because of its economic development, 
China will have evolved from a country self-sufficient in oil and gas 
production to one of the largest importers of oil and gas in the 
world.195  Chinas need for hydrocarbon energy will have to be met 
through purchases from current suppliers (the Middle East, for 
example) and through resource development in other parts of the 
world.196  This need will far exceed the hydrocarbon potential in the 
South China Sea.197  Therefore, even if China had a monopoly over 
the resources in the South China Sea, which it could secure only by 
pursuing a costly expansionist policy, it still would be heavily 
dependent upon the world oil and gas market and oil and gas 
extraction in other parts of the world. 
 In short, expansionism in the South China Sea would cost China 
too much while doing too little to address Chinas energy needs.  By 
contrast, even if China gave up the resources in the Spratlys to the 
Southeast Asian countries and simply bought oil and gas from the 
latter, it might still be able to do so on better terms than if it had 
purchased the same amount of oil and gas from other parts of the 
world.198  It is thus not unlikely that China will find joint 
management within the Prescott line an acceptable scenario, 
independently of the arguments concerning the schemes fairness 
advanced earlier.  Of course, whether Chinaor, for that matter, any 
of the other claimant countrieswill indeed accept such an 
arrangement will not be known until it is actually proposed. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 195. Id. 
 196. Xiaojie Xu, Oil and Gas Linkages Between Central Asia and China, at 
http://www.rice.edu. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Taking part in multilateral resource development in the South China Sea 
would presumably secure China even better terms, as well as make the resources 
available to China sooner. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 While limiting the discussion to certain existing proposed 
solutions to the Spratly disputes, this Article was intended to suggest 
a way of thinking about these proposals, and about the disputes in 
general, that is at odds with the prevailing discourse.  Instead of 
viewing the contention over the Spratlys through the foggy lens of 
regional security, this Article has argued that scholars and 
policymakers should search for notions of fairness that allow the 
contenders to advance their dialogue.  The Articles discussion of a 
particular notion of fairness applicable to the settlement of the 
Spratly disputes, as well as of the potential implementation of this 
notion of fairness in a joint management authority within the 
Prescott line, are quite schematic.  Moreover, it may fairly be objected 
that, even as an outline, the argument for joint management 
authority is incomplete.  In applying the principle of fairness (P), the 
argument emphasized the importance of giving weight to China and 
Vietnams historical claims to the Spratlys.  It was also pointed out 
that drawing the boundary of the joint management authority along 
the Prescott line possibly favors China.  Finally, even after explaining 
how this latter imbalance might be addressed by suitably designing 
the political structure of the joint management authority, it was 
suggested that China might still come away with a decent bargain.  It 
may thus seem that there has been too much focus on why China 
would be well served by accepting the joint management scheme with 
little showing that the scheme would strike others as fair. 
 A more persuasive case for a joint management authority in the 
Spratlys clearly requires a more full analysis of the interests of all 
potential participants, where even Chinas stakes have to be treated 
in a less cursory fashion.  This more comprehensive analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article, which aims only to identify the 
direction that such an analysis might take.  The incompleteness of a 
discussion, however, does not imply lack of impartiality.  In 
particular, the prominence of comments about Chinas claims and 
interests in this Article should not be interpreted as evidence of 
partiality towards China.  An elaboration of this last point will also 
allow a quick review of some key contentions of this Article. 
 First, suppose that a joint management scheme in the Spratlys, 
such as one within the Prescott line, is acceptable to China.  It would 
be a serious error to infer simply from this supposition that the 
scheme must beor is prima facie likely to beunacceptable in some 
way to the other Spratly claimants.  Such an inference can only be 
based on a presumption of irreconcilable interests among the 
claimant countries.  Despite a history of conflicting maritime claims 
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in the region, there is little empirical evidence in support of this 
presumption, which, shown in Part II, both has failed to generate 
sound predictions and is normatively at odds with the search for a 
peaceful solution.  Indeed, this presumption has come to seem even 
more implausible in 2002 as ASEAN and China enter full 
negotiations regarding an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement that 
would liberalize trade in the region at an even faster pace than the 
countries WTO memberships allow.199  It is a serious question why 
these countries are taken to be forever doomed to conflict in their 
maritime claims when they find common interests in so many other 
substantive areas. 
  Second, it was assumed in Part III that China and Vietnams 
territorial and maritime claims in the Spratlys based on historical 
title should be given some weight under international law.  In 
addition, some proposals for allocation of control were rejected 
precisely because they give no weight to these claims.  It is likely that 
this assumption, especially with respect to Chinas claims, will 
irritate some readers.  But if the discomfort is merely due to the fact 
that Chinas claims are not examined more closely, then the reply is 
that close analysis of the complex territorial and maritime claims in 
the Spratlys is not the purpose of this Article.  Rather, the Article 
explicitly builds on and refers to previous scholarly analyses.200  
Alternatively, it may be that these readers suspect that a closer 
examination of Chinas claims would lead to their complete dismissal.  
This outcome, however, is quite unlikely in view of the scholarly 
consensus alluded to at the beginning of this Article, which holds that 
there are serious weaknesses in each countrys claims.  In particular, 
Vietnam and the Philippines claims to the Spratlys are as expansive 
as Chinas and also rest on uncertain foundations.201  Consequently, 
any attempt to undermine a particular countrys claim is likely to 
raise doubts about the claims of other countries as well, at least if it 
is to remain impartial.  Such a negative tactic is then likely to lead to 
a subjective and futile exercise of deciding which countrys claims are 
less unworthy.  To say that no countrys claims to the Spratlys can be 
completely dismissed, on the other hand, is precisely to say that these 
claims will be given some weight under international law.  Moreover, 
it is clear that this latter statement by no means implies that any 
________________________________________________________________ 
 199. Compare Press Release, WTO, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations 
on Chinas Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
pres01_e/pr243_e.htm, with News Release, International Economics, ASEANChina 
Free Trade Agreement, at http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk. 
 200. See generally AUSTIN, supra note 1; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 2; Denoon 
& Brams, supra note 3; Dzurek, supra note 3.  
 201. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the 
Philippines expansive claim to the Spratlys). 
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countrys claims are superior to that of the others.  The assumption 
we have made about the validity of Chinas claims, in other words, is 
in fact quite weak. 
 Third and finally, it should be recalled that the principle of 
fairness formulated in Part III.B. (principle (P)), which states that in 
any fair settlement of the Spratlys dispute, no party should be asked 
to sacrifice its legitimate claims either without a similar sacrifice on 
the part of all other parties or without adequate compensation, makes 
no reference to any countrys particular circumstances or claims.  The 
plausibility of the principle can be appreciated or debated in the 
abstract.  Such an articulation of a general conception of fairness is 
perhaps the best guarantee we can have of impartiality in assessing 
concrete proposed solutions.  It ensures that we do not confuse justice 
with advantage, equity with realpolitik.  This is the case even when a 
particular application of the abstract principle is uncertain.  For 
example, our application of principle (P) to the justification of a joint 
management authority within the Prescott line (in Part IV.B.) is 
certainly less clear-cut and more controversial than our application of 
the same principle (in Part III.B) in developing criticisms of certain 
allocation proposals.  Even in the former case, however, the 
availability of an abstract articulation of the notion of fairness 
establishes a point of reference.  It assures us that we are trying to 
apply a notion of fairness that is broadly acceptable, and not 
operating only with China or Vietnam or any other countrys sense of 
fairness.  And it is the hope of this Article to have shown that, at 
present, it is precisely in this regard that scholarly discussion can 
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APPENDIX: STRAIGHT BASELINES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA  
 Drawing a median line between the outermost coastal 
projections and islands of all states bordering on the South China 
Sea, on the one hand, and the outermost islands, rocks, and 
occupied low-tide elevations of the Spratly Region,202 on the other, 
involves the use of straight baselines in two ways.  First, littoral 
countries have used straight baselines to determine the extension of 
their maritime jurisdiction and exorbitant baselines may diminish 
the area falling under joint management.203  Second, because the 
Spratlys are a collection of tiny islands, cays, and rocks, straight 
baselines connecting them seem inevitable for determining the 
median line between the Spratlys as a whole and bordering states.204  
Drawn without sufficient care, such baselines can diminish the areas 
that rightfully fall under the bordering states jurisdiction.205 
 The straight baselines at the margin of the South China Sea can 
now reasonably precisely be understood thanks to Victor Prescotts 
recent discussion of the subject.206  Malaysia and Brunei have not 
drawn any straight baselines,207 and the Philippines archipelagic 
baselines around its recognized territorynot counting its claim to 
the Spratlys, of which more anonare generally recognized as non-
problematic.208  Trouble arises from Vietnam and Chinas use of 
straight baselines, and as far as delimitation around the Spratlys is 
concerned, there are two problems.  First, two of Vietnams baselines 
that connect Hon Hai Islet to other points (see Exhibit 10) are 
objectionable, [enabling] Vietnam to claim 14,000 square nm of 
internal waters and territorial waters than would have been obtained 
by more appropriate baselines.209  Presumably, if these baselines 
were used to delimit the median line from Spratly features, the area 
on the other side of the median line would have been diminished by at 
________________________________________________________________ 
 202. PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra 
note 6, at 5-6. 
 203. For a study of the substance and history of international law regarding 
straight baselines, see generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S. WESTERMAN, 
STRAIGHT BASELINES IN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMINTATION (1992). 
See also generally J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 
(1994). 
 204. See generally REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 203. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA, supra note 6.  
 207. Id.  
 208. PRESCOTT, MARITIME JURISDICTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 209. PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra 
note 6, at 11-12. 
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most 7,000 square nm (half of 14,000).  To appreciate the significance 
of this impact, it is useful to know that  
[the] total area [within the Prescott line] is 172,000 nm; the area 
attributable to Scarborough Reef is 54,000 square nm of which 7,500 
overlaps with the Spratly Islands region. This means that the total area 
related to the Spratly Region including Scarborough Reef is 218,500 
square nautical miles. . . .  [The] marginal area of the South China Sea 
has an area of 585,500 square nm.210  
 Secondly, China has drawn straight baselines around the 
Paracel Islands in ways that, according to Prescott, violate 
international law.211  Through liberal baselines, China gains [an 
additional] 2,800 square nm of internal waters and territorial waters 
than it would under more appropriate baselines (see Exhibit 11).212  
These gains derive from baselines that surround the Paracel group, 
however, whereas the only baselines that would affect the drawing of 
the median line with respect to the Spratlys are those that face the 
Spratlys.  Therefore it is likely that Chinas illegitimate baselines in 
the Paracels have a negligible effect on the Prescott line. 
  Straight baselines in the Spratlys raise completely different 
issues. Here, with the exception of the Philippines, all claimants will 
be able to use only normal baselines along fringing reefs as prescribed 
in Article 6 of UNCLOS, and there are no obvious opportunities . . . 
to draw straight baselines in accordance with Article 7.213  By 
contrast, the Philippines, in virtue of being an archipelagic state, can 
drawand has drawnarchipelagic baselines around the Spratly 
features.214  If the Philippines can claim the Spratly features, then 
the water within these baselines would become archipelagic waters.  
In this sense, the Philippine claim to the Spratlys is more sweeping 
than either Vietnam or Chinas claims to all of the Spratly islands. 
 Prescott proposed two sets of adjustments to the Philippines 
archipelagic baselines, one of which, because it is roughly 
perpendicular to the median line between the Spratlys and the 
Philippines, has no effect on the median line (see Exhibit 12).215  The 
________________________________________________________________ 
 210. Id. at 6-7. 
 211. Id. at 17-19.  Prescott also criticized Chinas straight baselines drawn near 
and around Hainan Island.  Id. at 13-17.  However, because the Prescott line as a 
median line is measured from the Paracels, the Hainan baselines presumably have no 
effect on the Prescott line. 
 212. Id.  See also infra Exhibit 11.  
 213. Id. at 34.  
 214. Id. at 31-34 (describing two Philippine senate bills that specifiedand 
reducedMarcos 1978 Kalayaan claim).  Philippine claims to the Spratlys have 
always left out three reefs in the Spratly group that lie on Malaysias continental shelf.  
PRESCOTT, MARITIME JURISDICTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 7, at 18-21. 
 215. PRESCOTT, LIMITS OF NATIONAL CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, supra 
note 6, at 33.  
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other adjustment would reduce the archipelagic waters by about 
1500 square nm.216  It is not clear, however, whether Prescotts 
drawing of the median line is measured from baselines related to the 
Philippines archipelagic baselines.  Because the Prescott line was 
originally drawn not with a Spratly joint management authority in 
mind, it is likely that the Spratly baselines adopted were less precise, 
serving only heuristic purposes. 
________________________________________________________________ 
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